Climate Change & International Security: The Arctic as a Bellwether by Adam Lajeunesse et al.
Climate Change  
& international SeCurity:





Heather Exner-Pirot  








Heather Exner-Pirot  




Center for Climate and Energy Solutions
May 2012
CLIMATE CHANGE  
& INTERNATIONAL SECURITY:
THE ARCTIC AS A BELLWETHER
Prepared for C2ES
Center for Climate and Energy Solutionsii
Copyright, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions.
Huebert, R., H. Exner-Pirot, A. Lajeunesse, J. Gulledge (2012) “Climate change & international security: The Arctic as a 
Bellwether.” Arlington, Virginia: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. Available at: http://www.c2es.org/publications/
climate-change-international-arctic-security/
Climate Change & International Security: The Arctic as a Bellwether iii
CONTENTS
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
 I. INTRODUCTION 5
 II. THE CHANGING ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT 7
 Opening of the Arctic 7
 Implications Beyond the Arctic 12
 III. UNDERSTANDING THE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 15
 IV. ANALYSIS OF RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 17
 Finding 1: Unprecedented national attention to Arctic policy 17
 Finding 2: Emphasis on environmental security 17
 Finding 3: Desire for cooperation but resolve to protect national interests 17
 Finding 4: Remilitarization of the Arctic 18
 Finding 5: Non-Arctic states and organizations seek roles in the Arctic 21
 Finding 6: Underlying causes of policy developments 22
 V. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 23
 ANNEX: SURVEY OF RECENT ARCTIC SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS 27
 Circumpolar States 27
 Asia 34
 Multi-Lateral Organizations/Agreements 35
 Industry 39
 REFERENCES 43
Center for Climate and Energy Solutionsiv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) extends sincere thanks to the following individuals for 
sharing their thoughtful reviews and insights about the manuscript: Caitlyn Antrim (Rule of Law Committee for 
the Oceans), Dr. Marcus King (Elliot School of International Affairs), CDR Dr. James Kraska (U.S. Naval War 
College), CDR Blake McBride (U.S. Navy Task Force Climate Change), and Dr. Barry Zellen (Arctic Security 
Project, Naval Postgraduate School).
Climate Change & International Security: The Arctic as a Bellwether 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In its most recent assessment of global climate change, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences concluded, “A 
strong body of scientific evidence shows that climate change is occurring, is caused largely by human activities, 
and poses significant risks for a broad range of human and natural systems.” Impacts and rates of change are 
greatest in the Arctic, where temperatures have been increasing at about twice the global rate over the past four 
decades. The rapid decline in summer sea ice cover in the past decade has outpaced scientific projections and is 
drawing international attention to emerging commercial development and transport opportunities previously 
blocked by the frozen sea. The Arctic is therefore a bellwether for how climate change may reshape geopolitics in 
the post–Cold War era.
The trend toward seasonally open waters is driving increased interest and investment in oil and gas exploration, 
shipping, and fishing in the Arctic. The recent economic recession has not affected these developments signifi-
cantly, as they were always intended to be middle- to long-term developments following the progression of sea ice 
retreat. Indeed, high oil prices and advances in technology continue to support the drive toward offshore drilling 
in Arctic waters. The global economy, which has begun to show signs of recovery, is likely to rebound long before 
oil and gas exploration and shipping could be scaled up in the Arctic. China, India and the rest of the developing 
world’s growing middle classes will need oil and gas and other resources, and the world’s shipping routes are 
already so congested that the development of northern shipping routes is not a question of if, but when.
In response to these changes, many of the Arctic states have begun to re-examine their military capabilities 
to operate in the Arctic region. Some have started to rebuild their military forces, while most of the other states 
are drawing up plans to begin the rebuilding process. Multilateral organizations and non-Arctic states are also 
looking for new roles in the Arctic. All of these actors are attempting to come to terms with the meaning of 
Arctic security, a concept that was relatively simple during the icy decades of the Cold War. Recent national policy 
developments arising from the effects of climate change on the Arctic commons demonstrate that climate change 
is indeed a national and international security interest in the traditional strategic sense.
As the emerging Arctic security environment is in a very early stage of development, whether it will ultimately 
be predominantly cooperative or predominantly competitive remains an open question. Although the Arctic states 
invariably emphasize their desire to maintain a cooperative environment, several have stated that they will defend 
their national interests in the region if necessary. To gauge the geopolitical winds in the Arctic, this study catalogs 
and analyzes dozens of major policy statements and actions by the Arctic states, other states with Arctic interests, 
and multilateral organizations between 2008 and 2012. 
As a framework for interpreting the totality of these statements and actions, we compare geopolitical develop-
ments to date with three future security scenarios posited by the Arctic Council in its Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment 2009 Report. We adopt these scenarios as testable hypotheses for the purposes of this study:
•  Hypothesis 1: There is no emerging security environment and the circumpolar states have no new interests 
that would increase competition or conflict in the region. If this hypothesis is correct, a close examination 
of the actions of the circumpolar world should reveal no significant new foreign and defense policies and 
defense procurement decisions in relation to the Arctic. 
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•  Hypothesis 2: While showing renewed interest in the Arctic, the interested states are committed to devel-
oping and strengthening multilateral instruments of cooperation. New military capabilities are directed 
towards building local constabulary capacity and largely eschew escalation of war-fighting capability. 
•  Hypothesis 3: Increasing accessibility to Arctic resources because of climate change, along with a growing 
and increasingly modern military presence of strategic rivals in the region, becomes a recipe for competi-
tion and potential conflict. Under this hypothesis, the circumpolar states should be actively examining 
their core interests in the region, expressing concern over what other states are planning or doing in the 
region, and developing more assertive northern defense postures, including rebuilding their northern 
war-fighting capabilities. It is also expected that the various actors would be commencing the process of 
developing new defensive relationships and either strengthening old alliances or building new ones.
We assess which of these hypotheses most closely resembles the behavior of the key actors as revealed in their 
statements and actions. On the basis of the prevailing scenario(s), we consider the potential for instability and 
conflict in the Arctic and offer recommendations on how the states should proceed to ensure the region develops 
in a cooperative and peaceful manner.
MAIN FINDINGS
Finding 1: Unprecedented national attention to Arctic policy. 
A confluence of major policy announcements between 2008–2012 have followed Russia planting its flag at the North 
Pole in August 2007, the same week that Canada announced significant new Arctic military investments. Since then, 
major Arctic policy announcements have been made by Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, the United States, the 
European Union, the Nordic countries (Nordic Supportive Defence Structures, NORDSUP) and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). It is unprecedented to have numerous, major policy announcements—not just for the 
Arctic but for international affairs in general—from so many major players in such a short timeframe.
Finding 2: Emphasis on environmental security. 
By 2005 all Arctic governments and many others had come to officially accept that climate change was melting the 
Arctic ice cover, which meant that the Arctic was becoming more accessible to both the Arctic states and to the 
international community. This new accessibility raised two main concerns for the Arctic states. First was the need to 
maintain environmental security. In this context, environmental security can be understood as avoiding or mitigating 
acts leading to environmental damage or deterioration that could violate the interests of states and their populations, 
in particular their northern and northern indigenous peoples. The need to maintain the region’s environmental 
integrity in the face of increased economic activity was a prevalent theme in much of the Canadian, American, and 
Russian documentation. The second concern was the need for a constabulary capacity to monitor who arrives in each 
state’s waters and what they are doing there. Most of the Arctic states said they had inadequate means to police the 
area. Much of the proposed Arctic security policy has been justified as improving the states’ abilities to meet these 
new environmental and constabulary needs. 
Finding 3: Desire for cooperation but resolve to protect national interests. 
In most of their statements, the states have reiterated their commitment to collegiality and the principles of inter-
national law to ensure that an accessible Arctic is developed in a peaceful and cooperative manner. On the other 
hand, many of the Arctic states’ actions and statements make it clear that they intend to develop the military capacity 
to protect their national interests in the region. This approach implies that while diplomacy and cooperation are 
preferred, the Arctic nations will reserve the right to use unilateral force to defend their interests if necessary.
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Finding 4: Remilitarization of the Arctic. 
While the two previous findings suggest that the Arctic states are focused on building a cooperative security environ-
ment in the region, there is a third, apparently contradictory trend toward modernizing their military forces in the 
Arctic. Some have already begun rebuilding their Arctic military capabilities, and most of the others are drawing up 
plans to do so. Consequently, if political cooperation in the region should sour, most of the Arctic nations will have 
forces that are prepared to compete in a hostile environment.
Finding 5: Non-Arctic states and organizations seek roles in the Arctic. 
The EU and NATO have been examining the issues of governance and security in the Arctic. NATO’s initial focus 
appears to be on improving coordination of security-related issues, such as search and rescue. Given the importance 
of the region to NATO members such as Canada, Norway and the United States, it seems likely that NATO will 
remain engaged in the region. The EU’s interest is framed in the context of ensuring that new governance mecha-
nisms are designed to include the interests of all European states. The EU has also issued policy statements that 
place a strong emphasis on protecting the environment. Separate from the EU, France has announced that it plans 
to provide its military with some Arctic capabilities. Although it has not expressed geopolitical interest in the Arctic, 
China plans to increase its scientific research activities in the region and has added a strategic studies department to 
its Polar Research Institute.
Finding 6: Underlying causes of policy developments. 
The principal cause of renewed national interest in the Arctic is the increasing accessibility of Arctic waters resulting 
from global warming and new maritime technologies. Accessibility leads to the potential for new sea routes or the 
expansion of old ones, an important issue for both Russia and Canada. Western nations have focused on augmenting 
scientific research, environmental protection, sustainable development, and a constabulary and military presence. 
The United States stake in the Arctic is comparatively small, and historically it has tended to act with minimal interest 
in the region compared with the other Arctic states. Russia has invested tens of billions of dollars in Arctic oil projects, 
and its recent policy statements and actions suggest that it will act assertively to safeguard its oil wealth and position 
in the Arctic. Although oil and gas are less central to the core interests of the rest of the circumpolar powers, the 
importance of Arctic oil will grow for all nations as oil prices continue to rise and the desire for energy security grows. 
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
Taken as a whole, the Arctic policy statements and actions taken since 2008 clearly disprove Hypothesis 1. There 
can be no doubt that there is renewed national and international interest in the Arctic along both economic 
and strategic lines. However, distinguishing between Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 is more difficult, as many of 
the statements and actions of the polar states indicate both a sincere desire for peaceful cooperation and serious 
preparations for strong military capabilities to defend core national interests in the region. 
While Hypothesis 2 is the preferred outcome of all Arctic states, significant national investments in establishing 
a modern military capability in the north signals that core national interests are the top priority of most of them. 
Under these circumstances, competition and conflict (i.e. Hypothesis 3) could become the Arctic reality if coop-
erative mechanisms cannot keep pace with developments or otherwise prove inadequate to settle international 
disputes in the region. Continued monitoring of national and international developments in the Arctic will help 
clarify whether conditions are tipping more toward cooperation or more toward competition. A living component 
of this study will continue to track these developments over time and can be accessed via the Web at http://cmss.
ucalgary.ca/arcticsecurity.
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Maintaining security and peace in the Arctic will require adapting policies and institutions to the emerging 
environment there. First, the Arctic states need to strengthen existing multilateral institutions and agreements, 
especially those related to security. The U.S. Department of Defense, for example, wisely advocates the accession of 
the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea , which provides an important frame-
work by which to resolve disputes over, for example, the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Arctic. States 
also need to develop practical bilateral and multilateral agreements whereby their new Arctic capabilities can work 
together. Where practices develop to allow cooperation, that cooperation is easier to maintain should relations 
become strained due to factors developing outside of the Arctic. An early example of such practices is the develop-
ment of a search and rescue treaty, the first legally binding agreement to come out of the Arctic Council, which 
was signed by member states in May 2011. Joining these multilateral regimes, however, is not enough; Arctic states 
must renew a commitment to comply with existing obligations and implement their commitments as well.
Second, the Arctic states will need to acknowledge and deal with the renewal of military strength in the Arctic. 
This need runs counter to the tendency of states to publicly downplay the potential for military conflict in the 
Arctic in order to emphasize their legitimate desire for cooperation. The Arctic Council should reconsider its 
existing prohibition on discussing military security issues. Failure to do so may encourage the development of 
alternative forums such as the “Arctic Five” group of states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United 
States) that met at Ilulissat, Greenland in May 2008 and Quebec, Canada in March 2010. The challenges facing 
the Arctic are multi-dimensional and require both bilateral solutions, such as the Russian-Norwegian maritime 
border agreement, as well as a unified international response. A sectoral response to the multitude of issues that 
are increasingly developing in the region threatens to create a piecemeal, ad hoc governance system that may act 
to prevent the level of coordination needed to resolve future disputes. 
The widely held notion that climate change will occur gradually over the 21st century, allowing ample time 
for society to adapt, is belied by the unprecedented pace of both climate change and policy developments in the 
Arctic today. Such rapid changes will challenge governments’ abilities to anticipate and diplomatically resolve 
international disputes within the region. The lesson to the rest of the world might be to anticipate changes and 
adapt and/or react as soon as possible, using new and existing diplomatic tools, before core national interests take 
center stage and promote competition and possibly conflict. With global warming, time is of the essence, not only 
for mitigation, but for adaptation at both the community level and the international level. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
In its most recent assessment of global climate change, 
the U.S. National Academy of Sciences concluded, “A 
strong body of scientific evidence shows that climate 
change is occurring, is caused largely by human activi-
ties, and poses significant risks for a broad range of 
human and natural systems” (NRC 2011). Observed 
impacts are greatest in the Arctic, where temperatures 
are increasing at about twice the global rate (Screen 
and Simmonds 2010). The rapid decline in summer sea 
ice cover in the past decade has significantly outpaced 
projections, and estimates of how much time will pass 
before the Arctic becomes seasonally free of ice have 
been revised downward as a result (section II). These 
changes are ushering in a new era of Arctic geopolitics 
driven by global warming in combination with contem-
poraneous economic and political trends. The Arctic 
is therefore a bellwether for how climate change may 
reshape geopolitics in the post-Cold War era.
The Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment 2009 Report states, “Arctic natural resource 
development (hydrocarbons, hard minerals and 
fisheries) and regional trade are the key drivers of the 
future Arctic marine activity” (Arctic Council 2009). The 
United States Geological Survey (USGS) has estimated 
that “about 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas and 
13% of the world’s undiscovered oil may be found [in the 
Arctic], mostly offshore under less than 500 meters of 
water” (Gautier, et al. 2009). The assessment considered 
only conventional sources, so more oil and gas could be 
available from nonconventional sources such as coal bed 
methane, gas hydrates, oil shales, and oil sands. 
In addition to oil and gas, the Arctic is believed to 
be rich in other mineral resources. For example, the 
Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation has stated that the 
Mary River Project located on North Baffin Island “is the 
highest grade, large undeveloped iron ore project in the 
world that remains independently owned” (Baffinland 
Iron Mines Corporation 2008). 
As the sea ice retreats in the coming decades, 
potential trans-Arctic shipping routes offer significant 
economic and strategic advantages by shortening the 
distance needed to transport goods between Asia, North 
America, and Europe by up to 4000 nautical miles, and 
by reducing shipping time by up to two weeks. Arctic 
shipping also offers a cost-effective means by which to 
transport Northern resources, including oil, gas, and 
minerals, to southern markets. Several ship-building and 
oil companies are investing in the development of new 
types of ice-strengthened tankers and vessels to capitalize 
on such opportunities.
The economic value of an open Arctic remains 
unknown because the timing is uncertain and explora-
tion of the region has barely begun. Moreover, “there 
are many other factors and uncertainties of importance 
including governance, Arctic state cooperation, oil 
prices, changes in global trade, climate change vari-
ability, new resource discoveries, marine insurance 
industry roles, multiple use conflicts and Arctic marine 
technologies” (Arctic Council 2009). In addition to 
the availability of resources, therefore, political and 
economic forces will shape future activities in the Arctic.
In response to these changes, militaries and security 
analysts have begun to assess the implications of 
climate change for international security and foreign 
policy (European Union 2008, U.N. Secretary-General 
2009). In the United States, official military doctrine 
now holds that “climate change, energy security, and 
economic stability are inextricably linked” (U.S. DOD 
2010). Accordingly, the impacts of climate change are 
expected to act as a “threat multiplier” in many of the 
world’s most unstable regions, exacerbating droughts 
and other natural disasters as well as leading to food, 
water, and other resource shortages that may spur social 
instability, mass migrations, and possibly intra- and 
inter-state conflict. In the Arctic, military operations are 
being transformed by the changing physical environ-
ment as well as increased civilian presence and activities, 
and the U.S. military recognizes the need “to address 
gaps in Arctic communications, domain awareness, 
search and rescue, and environmental observation and 
forecasting capabilities to support both current and 
future planning and operations” (U.S. DOD 2010). Some 
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militaries have begun to rebuild their forces for Arctic 
operations, including the acquisition of submarines 
(Russia), ice breakers (Russia, Canada), Aegis-capable 
frigates (Norway), Arctic-capable patrol craft (Canada), 
unmanned aerial vehicles (Canada), and ground troops 
(Russia, Norway).
A new Arctic security environment is emerging. 
Powerful forces—natural and political—are reshaping 
the fabric of the Arctic. However, while Arctic security 
is widely discussed, it is little understood. Since 2008, 
Arctic security has received more attention from the 
circumpolar states and other interested parties than ever 
before. The circumpolar nations have begun rebuilding 
their Arctic military capabilities, with serious long-term 
ramifications for the peace, stability and security of the 
region (Huebert 2010). The core questions arise: How 
are these issues understood? What are the international 
ramifications of this growing quest for national security?
This report examines the developing Arctic security 
environment in three sections. The first provides an 
analysis of the recent security developments that have 
occurred in the Arctic. Special attention is given to 
policy statements and the building of new military 
forces for use in the Arctic. This section also provides 
a summation of current strategic trends as well as an 
assessment of the underlying causes of these new policies 
and actions. The second section (Annex) provides a 
summation of the northern security, defense and foreign 
policies, and actions of each of the circumpolar states, 
as well as other relevant international security organiza-
tions and agreements with references to documentation. 
A third, living element of this report can be found on 
the Web at http://cmss.ucalgary.ca/arcticsecurity. This 
Web page catalogs developments in chronological order 
and provides a direct link to each of the Arctic security, 
defense, and foreign policy documents and decisions. It 
will continue to be updated in the future.
Before beginning this evaluation, it is necessary to 
make two cautionary notes. First, we are still in the early 
days of this new security environment, and our under-
standing of the forces at work is still in the formative 
stages. Any findings at this point are preliminary. 
A second problem is assessing the developing Arctic 
security regime in connection to the greater international 
environment. Events elsewhere impact how the regime 
develops. For example, the 2008 conflict in Georgia 
created tension between Russia and NATO. Since five 
of the eight Arctic states—Canada, Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway and the United States—are members of NATO, 
the chill in relations that followed Russia’s action in 
Georgia could easily have upset Arctic relations. Similarly, 
the economic crisis that engulfed the world after the fall 
of 2008 and continues to plague many countries slowed 
some of the extractive and military projects planned in 
the region. The Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 2010 provoked concerns about drilling in the 
challenging waters of the Arctic, although Shell Oil’s 
plans to begin offshore exploration in the Arctic continue 
to progress (Bertrand 2012). 
In the medium to long term, however, trends are clear; 
as China, India and other rapidly developing economies 
grow more prosperous, there will be a demand for the 
Arctic’s newly accessible natural resources and shipping 
lanes. The ice that has long maintained the Arctic as a 
uniquely placid international space is receding rapidly. 
The Arctic Ocean is now opening up to the greater global 
society in ways completely unanticipated a decade ago. 
This new environment will create great opportunities 
and great challenges as new interests are developed and 
pursued by both the Arctic states and the larger interna-
tional community.
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II. THE CHANGING ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT
The intense economic and geopolitical attention paid 
to the Arctic today is driven largely by environmental 
changes in the region resulting from global warming. 
The circumpolar nations and other countries with large 
and growing economies are interested in new transport 
and tourism opportunities, as well as the mineral, fossil 
fuel, and fisheries resources that are becoming accessible 
within the region. The emergence of those new opportu-
nities is determined by the rate of decline of the seasonal 
sea ice cover; the summer sea ice has already retreated 
sufficiently for deepwater oil exploration to begin in 
2012 (Murphy 2012). 
Changes in the Arctic climate have serious implica-
tions for much of the world, not just the circumpolar 
nations. Changes in wind patterns may already have 
begun to alter seasonal climate extremes in Europe and 
the conterminous United States, leading to severe winter 
storms by allowing cold air to spill out of the Arctic into 
more southern latitudes (Liu, et al. 2012). The same 
phenomenon forces warm southern air into the Arctic, 
reinforcing the warming and loss of ice there (Overland 
and Wang 2010). Freshening and warming of the surface 
ocean in the Arctic has the potential to alter large-scale 
ocean circulation in the future, which would cause long-
term, unpredictable changes in the climate throughout 
the northern hemisphere (Mabey, et al. 2011).
OPENING OF THE ARCTIC
Since this paper focuses on geopolitics within the Arctic 
region, the most salient scientific context is the timing 
of the sea ice retreat. Sea ice undergoes a seasonal cycle 
in which it covers nearly the entire Arctic Ocean during 
the winter and shrinks back to a minimum extent during 
the summer. Each year the maximum extent occurs in 
March and the minimum extent in September. Both 
the March maximum and September minimum extents 
have been declining over the last three decades, with 
minimum extent declining more rapidly. Nine of the 
ten smallest extents on record occurred in the last ten 
years, and the five lowest occurred during the past five 
summers (2007–2011). As a result, the Northwest Passage 
through the Canadian Archipelago has opened up every 
summer since 2007, and the Northern Passage along 
Russia’s coastline has opened up every summer since 
2008 (Perovich, et al. 2011). 
The loss of Arctic sea ice is driven by a range of mecha-
nisms, including increasing air and ocean temperatures, 
changing wind patterns, decreased cloudiness exposing 
the ice to more direct sunlight, and the ice-albedo 
feedback, which amplifies local warming and accelerates 
ice loss as more ocean water is exposed to sunlight. Much 
of the surface warming and the resultant ice-albedo 
feedback are attributable to human-induced warming 
of the climate system through emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) and black soot particles, which accelerate 
the melting of snow and ice (Shindell and Faluvegi 2009). 
However, natural climate variability is especially strong in 
the Arctic, and the precise contributions of human and 
natural drivers cannot yet be disentangled on decadal 
time scales. This uncertainty does not cast doubt on 
whether human-induced warming is pushing the Arctic 
toward an ice-free state, but it complicates predictions of 
when a seasonally ice-free state is likely to occur and to 
what extent reducing human-induced drivers—green-
house gas and soot emissions—could delay or reverse the 
trend toward an ice-free state.
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Since 1975 the Arctic has warmed at about twice the 
rate of the globe as a whole (Fig. 1). This phenomenon, 
called Arctic amplification, is an expected consequence 
of global warming and is caused primarily by the loss of 
light-reflecting sea ice during the summer, in addition 
to a variety of secondary mechanisms (Screen and 
Simmonds 2010, Richter-Menge, Jeffries and Overland 
2011). Current temperatures in the Arctic exceed the mid-
20th century maximum by more than 0.5°C/1°F (Fig. 1). 
FIGURE 1: Changes in global average surface temperature and average surface  
temperature in the Arctic
Five-year running averages of annual surface temperatures for the whole globe (tan line) and for the Arctic region above 70° N (red line) 
from 1900 through 2011. The plots show deviations from the 1900–1919 average for each data set. 70° N roughly parallels the Arctic 
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Historical observations compiled from ships, land, 
and air indicate that there was no trend in the extent of 
Arctic sea ice during the first half of the 20th century 
(Fig. 2, open circles). The modern decline began after 
1960 in an era when observations are considered to 
be reliable (Walsh and Chapman 2001, Kinnard, et al. 
2008). Continuous observations from polar-orbiting 
satellites are available beginning in 1979 (Fig. 2, solid 
lines; Figure 3, top). Comparing recent satellite measure-
ments to early 20th century estimates suggests that the 
total extent of Arctic sea ice has declined by about 12% at 
the winter maximum and by almost 50% at the summer 
minimum (Fig. 2).
A closer look at the modern satellite data shows that the 
rate of decline in sea ice extent has accelerated over the 
past decade, especially at the summer minimum (Fig. 3, 
top). From 2000 through 2011, the average rate of decline 
in the sea ice extent was more than twice the rate for the 
entire satellite-observing period (1979–2011). Regardless 
of whether this acceleration is driven by human-induced 
climate change or by natural variability, lost ice is less 
likely to recover in a warming world. In this sense, human-
induced warming is responsible for persistent loss of 
ice even if natural variability played a role in the initial 
melting (Perovich and Richter-Menge 2009).
FIGURE 2: Century-scale changes in annual maximum and minimum Arctic sea ice extent
Maximum and minimum annual Arctic sea ice extent from 1900 through 2011. Historical data (open circles) were compiled from various 
ship, land, and air observations from many sources. Continuous satellite observations (solid red and tan lines) began in 1979. Each plot 
shows deviations from the 1900–1930 average for the historical data. Data sources: Kinnard et al. (2008) and Fetterer, et al. (2002).
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FIGURE 3: Recent changes in annual Arctic sea ice extent and volume
Maximum and minimum annual Arctic sea ice extent (top) and volume (bottom) from 1979 through 2011. Extent is directly observed by polar-
orbiting satellites. Volume is estimated from an ice-ocean-atmosphere model that assimilates extent and temperature data from observations. 
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Sea ice extent gives an incomplete picture of ice loss 
because it ignores changes in ice thickness. Historically, 
a large fraction of the sea ice has survived over multiple 
years, and each winter an additional layer of snow is 
deposited on top of this ice; the older the base layer, the 
thicker the ice. The area of the Arctic covered by sea ice 
four or more years old shrank to a record low in 2011, at 
just 19 percent of the average area covered from 1982 to 
2005 (Perovich, et al. 2011). The rapid warming of the 
past decade has melted much of the multiyear ice, leaving 
a younger, thinner ice cover that is more susceptible to 
future warming (Maslanik, et al. 2011, Comiso 2012). 
The change in total sea ice volume is a sensitive 
indicator of ice loss since it accounts for both extent 
and thickness. Estimates from the PIOMAS Arctic ice 
model indicate that about three-quarters of the summer 
minimum ice volume has been lost since 1979, and 
the rate of loss for 2000-2011 is more than twice the 
rate for 1979–2011 (Fig. 3, bottom). Winter maximum 
volume is also declining, albeit at a slower rate. A smaller 
maximum volume makes the sea ice more vulnerable 
to future warming, promoting further acceleration of 
summer ice loss. As for the cause of declining sea ice 
volume, the investigators conclude, “it is very unlikely 
that a trend in ice volume as obtained by PIOMAS, 
even accounting for large potential errors, would have 
occurred without anthropogenic forcings” (Schweiger, et 
al. 2011).
Projections of future Arctic sea ice loss vary widely. 
The simplest approach is to extrapolate forward in time, 
assuming that ice loss will proceed in a similar manner 
to observed losses. This crude approach is laden with 
assumptions: What past observations are most relevant 
to future rates of loss? Is a linear or nonlinear fit to the 
data more appropriate? If the latter, what sort of curve 
shape should be applied to the data? Applying a range 
of assumptions offers at best upper and lower bounds 
on the potential timing of a seasonally ice-free Arctic. A 
linear extrapolation of the decline of summer minimum 
sea ice extent from 1979 through 2011 puts the emer-
gence of a seasonally ice-free Arctic around 2070 (Fig. 
4). A linear extrapolation of the loss rate between 2000 
FIGURE 4: Statistical projections of future Arctic sea ice extent
Statistical projections of future Arctic sea ice extent based on different assumptions of future loss rates. The nonlinear projection uses a 
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and 2011 puts the opening of the Arctic around 2040. 
If ice loss continues to accelerate as it has done over the 
past three decades, then the Arctic could be seasonally 
ice-free by 2025. 
Although further acceleration of ice loss is likely, 
physics-based climate models indicate that the rate of 
ice loss is likely to slow before the Arctic progresses to 
an ice-free state. Consequently, the statistical linear and 
nonlinear projections in Figure 4 could overestimate the 
rate of future ice loss. The Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC-
AR4) examined the evolution of sea ice extent through 
the end of the 21st century in more than a dozen climate 
models forced by increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. Few of these models projected an ice-
free Arctic before the end of the 21st century, and then 
only under the highest GHG emissions scenario (Meehl, 
et al. 2007). However, these models underestimate sea ice 
loss compared with observed changes over the past three 
decades, suggesting they are likely to underestimate 
future changes (Stroeve, et al. 2007). 
A more recent analysis revealed that a subset of 
the IPCC-AR4 model runs from seven climate models 
accurately simulated the observed relationship between 
1°C of Arctic warming and the decrease in sea ice area 
(Zhang 2010). When constrained by this relationship 
and forced by a mid-range GHG emissions scenario, this 
subset of models projected the emergence of an ice-free 
Arctic between 2037 and 2065, with the definition of “ice 
free” being 80% loss of the historical summer sea ice 
area. A definition of 90% loss delayed the opening until 
2050-2072. A similar study that constrained the IPCC-
AR4 models based on their ability to simulate observed 
seasonal sea ice dynamics found a median projection for 
the emergence of a virtually ice-free Arctic in 2037; the 
first quartile of the range of projections occurs in the 
late 2020s (Wang and Overland 2009). In spite of their 
simplicity, therefore, the statistical projections in Figure 
4 are strikingly similar to physics-based model projec-
tions that have been constrained to reflect key elements 
of observed sea ice response to climate change.
This analysis is consistent with the conclusions of the 
U.S. Navy’s Arctic Roadmap, released in October 2009: 
While significant uncertainty exists in projec-
tions for Arctic ice extent, the current scientific 
consensus indicates the Arctic may experience 
nearly ice free summers sometime in the 2030’s. 
… [T]his opening of the Arctic may lead to 
increased resource development, research, 
tourism, and could reshape the global trans-
portation system. These developments offer 
opportunities for growth, but also are potential 
sources of competition and conflict for access 
and natural resources (U.S. Navy 2009).
IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE ARCTIC*
The discussion about the opening of the Arctic has 
focused largely on the emergence of new economic 
benefits. However, the risks have received less attention, 
in part because much of the science remains uncertain. 
Nonetheless, enough is known to identify a variety of 
potentially risky outcomes with global implications 
(Schiermeier 2006, Sommerkorn and Hassol 2009, 
Kraska 2010). 
•  An ice-free Arctic Ocean will absorb more sunlight 
and convert it to heat, thus amplifying warming.
•  The Arctic currently removes CO2 from the 
atmosphere, but sea ice loss would likely cause it to 
switch to releasing CO2 and methane (a very potent 
greenhouse gas) to the atmosphere, further ampli-
fying global warming.
•  Mid-latitude atmospheric circulation, and therefore 
precipitation and storm patterns may have already 
been altered by sea ice loss.
•  A warmer, ice-free Arctic Ocean with more 
freshwater from snow and ice melt may slow key 
heat-transporting currents in the North Atlantic 
Ocean, thus cooling Europe and further warming 
other parts of the world. These changes would alter 
marine ecosystems (i.e. fisheries) and precipitation 
and storm patterns, on a broad scale.
•  Amplified warming will accelerate melting of 
land-based ice, thus accelerating sea level rise. The 
Greenland Ice Sheet could become destabilized, 
leading to abrupt and massive sea level rise beyond 
the 21st century.
Because the potential economic benefits of the 
opening of the Arctic are large, there is a substantial 
need for more concerted effort to resolve the risks so that 
they can be weighed against the benefits. At this stage, 
*  This section is reproduced from Mabey, et al. (2011) under the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 license. Minor modi-
fications were made by the original author (J. Gulledge).
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however, it is not safe to assume that the opening of the 
Arctic will necessarily yield net benefits for all interested 
states or to humanity as a whole.
It is precisely this uncertainty combined with the 
realization that the Arctic is on the verge of a dramatic 
and drastic transformation that has led the states of 
the circumpolar north to pay much greater attention to 
their northern regions. On one hand there is substantial 
effort to develop a cooperative governance regime based 
on goodwill and shared interests. On the other hand, 
the same Arctic states have begun to strengthen and 
expand their military and security capabilities in the 
Arctic. Further complicating this environment are the 
increasing number of non-Arctic states and actors that 
are increasing both their interests and capabilities to 
operate in the region. 
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
To understand the current Arctic security environment 
it is necessary to briefly set the historical context. Most 
of the Arctic states were belligerents in the Cold War, 
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
and a compliant Finland on one side and the NATO 
states, including Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway 
and the United States, on the other side (with a neutral 
Sweden in the middle). Due to both the geography of 
the region and the technology of the existing weapon 
systems, the Arctic region became a focal point of the 
conflict. Deterrence policy required each side to be able 
to monitor the actions of the other over the vast expanse 
of the north. Should deterrence fail, the north would 
become the main transit point for the ensuing missile 
attacks between North America and the USSR. 
When the Cold War ended, most Arctic military 
capabilities were either dismantled or reduced. With 
little or no prospect for commercial development in the 
Arctic, the 1990s were a period of benign neglect for 
the region as the attention of the former belligerents 
focused elsewhere. Limited effort was made to develop 
new multilateral instruments to facilitate a cooperative 
governance of the region. The most successful of these 
efforts—the Arctic Council—became a leading body 
for understanding and developing responses to growing 
environmental issues, and international cooperation in 
the region has focused consequently on environmental 
security. In this context, environmental security can be 
understood as avoiding or mitigating acts leading to envi-
ronmental damage or deterioration that could violate 
the interests of Arctic states and their populations, in 
particular their northern and northern indigenous 
peoples. While initially focused on pollution prevention, 
this emphasis has gradually merged with more tradi-
tional security concerns. 
After the dissolution of the USSR, the new Russian 
government found itself burdened with a large number 
of nuclear-powered submarines that were literally 
rusting in northern Russian harbors. At the same time, 
scientists discovered that certain classes of pesticides 
and fertilizers—deemed ‘persistent organic pollutants’ 
(POPs)—produced and used in locations as far south 
as India, were transported long distances to the polar 
region through a complicated system of ocean currents 
and large-scale wind patterns. Both the Soviet submarines 
and the POPs were seen as serious threats to pristine 
Arctic ecosystems and to Arctic peoples. International 
agreements were successfully developed to resolve both 
of these problems. The Soviet submarines were addressed 
first by the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation 
Program (AMEC)—an agreement between Norway, 
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—and 
subsequently by the G8. The international community 
responded to the threat of the POPs through the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. 
Partly due to the perceived insignificance of the 
region, little else was done to strengthen international 
cooperation. The harsh, icy climate was deemed too 
formidable for domestic and international activities 
to occur, but the warming climate began to challenge 
that perception by the turn of the century. It became 
apparent through observations by both the northern 
aboriginal peoples and scientists working in the Arctic 
that some fundamental changes were occurring in 
the environment. Subsequent scientific assessment 
coordinated by the Arctic Council found that climate 
change was transforming the Arctic on a scale and scope 
unprecedented in modern times (ACIA 2005). 
The most significant (but by far not the only) effect of 
climate change has been melting of the Arctic ice cover 
as established in the previous section. As a result of the 
dramatic seasonal ice loss, the circumpolar states and 
other major economies now see the region as accessible 
and brimming with untapped economic potential. This 
awareness is accompanied by concerns that competition 
and disputes will arise in the region. Consequently, a new 
Arctic security environment is emerging. The issue to be 
addressed is what this new environment will look like and 
what its ramifications are for international relations and 
foreign policy. 
The Arctic Council has begun to consider these 
ramifications through the Arctic Marine Shipping 
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Assessment (Arctic Council 2009). The Assessment high-
lighted several fictional scenarios, three of which explore 
plausible paths that the Arctic security environment 
could take in the future. As a framework for interpreting 
the emerging Arctic security environment, we adopt 
these scenarios as testable hypotheses and compare them 
to recent geopolitical developments in the region:
Hypothesis 1: There is no emerging security environ-
ment; the circumpolar states have no new interests that 
could cause an increase in competition and conflict. 
Predictions of military build-up have been vastly 
overstated and no activity has occurred that warrants 
concern. In effect, the talk of a “race for resources” in 
the region or a new “Arctic Cold War” is nothing more 
than media hype and alarmism. If this hypothesis 
is correct, a close examination of the actions of the 
circumpolar world should reveal that little has changed 
in the region since the 1990s. 
Hypothesis 2: While new policy activity and some new 
Arctic military construction have occurred, the Arctic 
nations remain committed to developing the circum-
polar region in a peaceful and cooperative fashion. 
New Arctic capabilities and policies have occurred in 
the context of improving local abilities to facilitate and 
monitor new activities in the region. These efforts are 
directed towards improving environmental protection, 
law enforcement, and search and rescue capabilities. 
Forces are not being developed primarily because of 
international security concerns, but rather to address 
emerging domestic issues. Support for this hypothesis 
would come from limited defense building with a 
focus on constabulary forces rather than war-fighting 
capability. Individual states would be modernizing 
their security and foreign policies with an emphasis on 
diplomacy and cooperation in the North; there would be 
renewed focus on developing and strengthening multilat-
eral mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 3: Developments in the Arctic are trans-
forming the region into a strategically important area 
with increasing competition and potential for conflict. 
Increased accessibility to the region, its substantial 
resource potential, a focus on of core national interests, 
and growing unilateral and bilateral military capabilities 
among the Arctic states, greatly increase the potential 
for conflict. If this hypothesis best explains the evolving 
security environment, the circumpolar states should be 
developing more assertive northern foreign and defense 
policies that would support unilateral actions. They 
should be dedicating more attention to their national 
interests in the region and expressing concern about 
what other states plans and actions there. States should 
be rebuilding an Arctic war-fighting capability that 
obviously exceeds a primarily constabulary capacity. The 
various actors should be exploring bilateral and multilat-
eral defensive alignments based on shared threats. 
The next section analyzes recent policy developments 
and actions in the Arctic in light of these hypotheses. If 
the last hypothesis is correct, steps must be taken now to 
minimize points of contention between states. Initiatives 
should be taken now to mitigate and contain potentially 
antagonistic elements of the new security environment. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
This section summarizes six key findings based on the 
survey of recent policy developments detailed in the 
Annex to this paper. The relevant documentary sources 
are provided in the Annex. 
FINDING 1: UNPRECEDENTED NATIONAL  
ATTENTION TO ARCTIC POLICY
There can be no doubt that the Arctic has emerged as 
a major focus for both the circumpolar states and an 
increasing number of non-Arctic states and non-state 
actors. Foreign and defense ministries began to focus 
intently on the changing Arctic in the mid-2000s. While 
both Canada and the EU issued northern dimensions 
of their foreign policies in 2000, and Norway issued its 
Soria Moria Declaration in November 2005, it was the 
Russian flag-planting at the North Pole in August 2007 
and the Ilulissat meeting of the five coastal Arctic states 
in May 2008 that led to a virtual blizzard of new policy 
statements and initiatives from Arctic stakeholders, 
including Canada, Iceland, Norway, Russia, the United 
States, Finland, Denmark and Sweden, the EU, NATO, 
and the Nordic countries jointly (NORDSUP). 
To have so many major policy announcements from 
so many major players in so short a time frame appears 
is unusual in international affairs, and there is no 
precedent for such intense interest in the Arctic. While 
each declaration was different, some common themes 
emerged, including an emphasis on environmental 
security, a desire for international cooperation, and 
resolve to protect national interests. These new priorities 
have led to the remilitarization of the Arctic. 
FINDING 2: EMPHASIS ON  
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
Arctic policy documents and statements almost invariably 
began with an acknowledgement of the rapid rate of envi-
ronmental change in the region. By 2005 all governments 
had come to officially accept that climate change was 
melting the Arctic ice cover and understood that to mean 
the Arctic was becoming more accessible for both their 
own interests as well as for the international community. 
Two main concerns followed from this realization. 
First, while climate change was acknowledged as 
fundamentally changing the entire Arctic ecosystem, 
the region was still regarded as being particularly 
environmentally sensitive, and most of the policy state-
ments emphasized the need to maintain environmental 
security and sustainable development. Since most of the 
Arctic had not previously been exposed to widespread 
economic activity, there was a clear desire to get it right 
from the beginning. Both Canada and the United 
States made it clear that the sustainable development of 
the region within their national control was a priority. 
Canada stated that one of the driving forces for control-
ling both the land and water of its Arctic territory was to 
protect its environment. This theme was also prevalent 
in much of the Russian documentation; Russia claimed 
the need to protect its Arctic environment to justify 
extending its control over both the lands and the waters 
of its Arctic region. 
The second concern that follows from increased 
international activity in the Arctic is the need for 
increased policing and security presence. The inherent 
assumption is that as activity increases in the region, 
it will be necessary to improve each state’s ability to 
monitor who is arriving in its Arctic and what they are 
doing there. It then becomes necessary to police the new 
activities. Most of the Arctic states developing the new 
policies have made it clear that they do not believe that 
they currently have adequate means to police the area. 
Consequently, much of the actual and proposed building 
plans are justified as improving the states’ ability to meet 
these demands. 
FINDING 3: DESIRE FOR COOPERATION BUT  
RESOLVE TO PROTECT NATIONAL INTERESTS
There is a clear desire by the circumpolar states to 
ensure that the Arctic remains a region of cooperation. 
Almost all statements have reiterated the issuing state’s 
commitment to the principles of international law to 
ensure that the Arctic is developed in a peaceful and 
cooperative manner. 
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This was the stated intent of the five coastal Arctic 
states developing claims for extended continental shelves 
(Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United 
States). In May 2008, they jointly issued the Ilulissat 
Declaration, stating that any differences the states may 
have over the determination of the new boundaries 
would be resolved peacefully and in accordance with 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). While it is still too soon to know if this 
declaration will be honored, the effort is a positive sign 
of the states’ current intent. 
Two additional developments underscore the Arctic 
states’ efforts to promote cooperation. The first involves 
the resolution of a four-decade-long dispute between 
Norway and Russia, wherein the boundary between 
the two countries’ in the Barents Sea was delimited in 
September 2010. The second was the signing of a search 
and rescue treaty by all eight Arctic Council members in 
May 2011. Since most of its articles exist in various inter-
national laws and practices already, it is not an impressive 
treaty in and of itself. However, it is significant as the first 
legally binding treaty to be negotiated through the Arctic 
Council. Also, because the treaty establishes a Permanent 
Secretariat, its marks progress towards a more institution-
alized forum for Arctic governance. Both developments 
indicate a political impetus to enhance regional coopera-
tion and stability amidst the current geopolitical changes. 
Even though all of the Arctic states assert in their 
policy statements that there is no military threat in the 
Arctic, as there was during the Cold War, most of the 
policies nonetheless state clearly that the individual 
states will take the steps they deem necessary to protect 
their core interests in the region. For example, the 
United States’ 2009 policy statement discusses at length 
its interest in fostering cooperative behavior in the 
Arctic. The document even suggests the possibility of 
broadening the Arctic Council’s jurisdiction beyond 
environmental security, which the United States has been 
reluctant to support in the past. However, the document 
also clarifies that the United States will act unilaterally 
if necessary to defend its core interests in the Arctic. 
The Canadian, Norwegian and Russian documents take 
similar positions. 
The core interests for the United States may be 
characterized as freedom of the seas and security; for 
Canada, sovereignty; for Norway, regional stability, espe-
cially with Russia; and for Russia, the economic potential 
in its Arctic hydrocarbon reserves. 
FINDING 4: REMILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC
In spite of the emphasis on cooperation revealed in the 
previous two findings of this report, the backdrop of 
international competition and resolve to defend core 
interests sets the stage for remilitarization and potential 
conflict in the Arctic. Looking beyond the statements 
of cooperation that have accumulated since 2008, there 
is a quiet but developing trend toward the Arctic states 
modernizing their military forces. Some have already 
begun rebuilding their Arctic military capabilities and 
most of the others are drawing up plans to do so. 
The Russians have been the most public about 
their military intentions. The 2007–2015 Russian State 
Armament Programme emphasizes the rebuilding of 
their northern naval capabilities. Under this program 
the Russians will build new nuclear-powered subma-
rines, including both fast attack (SSNs) and nuclear 
missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs). The Russian 
geographic reality means that these vessels will be based 
in northern waters. The head of the Russian Navy has 
stated that the Russians also plan to build five or six 
carrier battle-groups, which would be primarily based 
at their northern bases. Available information suggests 
they have completed construction of one new SSBN, are 
building two others, and are about to begin construction 
of a fourth. Planning appears to be underway for the 
construction of their SSNs as well. The Russians have 
recently reached an agreement with the French govern-
ment to purchase at least four Mistral-class amphibious 
assault vessels. The Mistrals would substantially increase 
the offensive capability of the Russian navy, particularly 
for projecting landward force. Not surprisingly, the 
announcement of the sale has been greeted with concern 
by many of Russia’s northern neighbors.
The Russians have also resumed a significant military 
presence in the Arctic. In August 2007 they restarted 
long-range bomber patrols. In the same year they 
also resumed northern patrols of naval surface units. 
They have been careful to remain within international 
airspace, but in some instances have approached the 
borders of Canada, Norway, and the United States. In the 
case of Norway, Russia’s naval ships have sailed into some 
of the maritime regions that the two states disagreed 
about at the time, although that border dispute has 
since been resolved. In 2009, they also sailed a group of 
submarines (both SSNs and SSBNs) to the waters near 
the North Pole and test launched a number of ballistic 
missiles. In the same year they conducted a major 
northern military exercise. 
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Russia is not alone in resuming Arctic military activity. 
Canada had ceased almost all of its activities in its north 
at the end of the Cold War. In August 2002 it conducted 
a small training exercise in its western Arctic. The exer-
cises have continued annually and involve all elements 
of the Canadian Forces. At the same time, Stephen 
Harper‘s government has made a series of announce-
ments about increasing Canadian military capabilities 
in the Arctic, including building an army training base 
in Resolute, Nunavut, and the developing a refueling 
facility in Nanisivik, Nunavut. The Rangers militia 
unit, which relies heavily on the northern skills of the 
Indigenous peoples, is being expanded, and a regular 
reserve company was placed in Yellowknife. While 
progress has been slow on implementing these decisions, 
the Harper government remains committed to them. 
The Canadian government had also committed to 
building three Joint Supply Ships for the Navy, which 
were intended to have some limited Arctic capability. 
However, when the first proposal was submitted to 
the Canadian government they were found to be 
too expensive and the fate of the program is now in 
question. When campaigning for the 2006 federal 
election, Stephen Harper promised to build three 
armed icebreakers for the Canadian Navy. This promise 
morphed into the development of six to eight Arctic 
Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) for the Navy and a single 
icebreaker for the Canadian Coast Guard. Both sets of 
vessels are expected to begin construction soon. The new 
icebreaker—the Diefenbaker—will be built by Seaspan/
Vancouver Shipyards Co. Ltd., to be delivered in 2017. 
The AOPS are slated to be built by Irving Shipbuilding of 
Halifax’s shipyard over the next nine years.
The United States never entirely ceased its Arctic 
military activities, continuously deploying nuclear-
powered submarines to the region, although at a reduced 
level relative to the Cold War era. Since 1986, it has 
conducted joint operations in the Arctic with British 
submarines. The Americans have also placed one of their 
two antiballistic interceptor missile sites in Alaska, and 
maintain three wings (22 aircraft each) of fighters for air 
defense there. The older F-15s that equipped these wings 
are gradually being replaced with new F-22 raptors. 
Ultimately, the Americans plan to deploy up to 1/5 of 
their fleet of new F-22s in Alaska. In 2009 the United 
States deployed at least three submarines to the Arctic, 
including for the first time one of its newest Virginia 
class SSN submarines—the USS Texas.
The United States released its national Arctic policy 
in January 2009. The policy placed Arctic security as the 
number one priority. Similarly, in 2008 the Commander 
of Northern Command stated that he expects to see 
increased competition in the Arctic and as such was 
developing new plans for the region. In October 2009 
the United States Navy issued a report called The Navy 
Arctic Roadmap on its strategy to prepare for an increas-
ingly open and busy Arctic. The strategy calls on the 
United States to strengthen its military capabilities in 
the region, but is not specific about what new assets that 
would entail.
A related debate that the Americans have been 
engaged in for some time without resolution is the 
building of new icebreakers. The American icebreakers 
are manned by their Coast Guard, which is part of 
their armed forces. They are currently reduced to three 
vessels. Of these, two are ending their operational life 
and one in particular is unlikely to see future use. The 
only operational icebreaker, USCGC Healy, was designed 
primarily to support scientific research and serves as a 
research vessel for the National Science Foundation and 
engages in search and rescue missions as needed. The 
Americans’ long engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan 
has prevented the Coast Guard from making its case for 
new ice-breakers. However recent statements from the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard suggest that making 
this case is now one of their top priorities. There are signs 
that the Obama Administration will in fact agree to fund 
the construction of at least one new icebreaker.
Norwegian military developments have not received 
much attention but have been substantial. Through the 
1990s and 2000s Norway has been busy re-equipping a 
small but capable military designed to fight a powerful 
enemy in cooperation with its American ally. They have 
built a class of five frigates, the Fridtjof Nansen-class, 
outfitted with the Americans’ Aegis Combat System, 
which deploys radar-guided weapons to track and destroy 
enemy targets. This is the smallest vessel on which the 
system has been successfully outfitted. One of the core 
missions of these ships is to defend against future air 
threats. There is also growing suspicion that this system 
could be used to support the American antiballistic 
missile system, which President Obama has moved from 
planned installations in Central Europe to warships 
staging in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas. Arctic 
geopolitics aside, the issue of missile defense is already 
a key source of tension between Russia and the United 
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States. The Norwegians have also built a class of very 
fast and powerful missile patrol vessels. The Skjold-class 
vessels are capable of travelling at speeds over 100 knots 
and are designed for anti-ship and anti-aircraft roles 
in local waters. Norway has also built an armed Coast 
Guard vessel that can operate in ice up to a meter thick. 
In November 2008 the Norwegian Air Force announced 
plans to acquire 48 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. Most 
recently, Norway announced that it will re-equip one of its 
existing land force units to serve as an Arctic battalion. 
To complement its top-flight northern military 
capabilities, Norway has developed a sophisticated 
foreign and defense policy. On the one hand they have 
repeatedly emphasized their intention to develop the 
Arctic in a cooperative manner. Specifically, they have 
clearly stated that they do not view the Russians as a 
threat and that they are working closely with them on 
many issues. At the same time, they are building up the 
necessary military forces to defend their core interests 
should cooperative efforts ultimately prove unsuccessful. 
Both Sweden and Finland have issued policies that 
outline their relationship with the circumpolar world as 
well as with non-Arctic states that are expressing interest 
in the region. Both states have emphasized their desire 
to see the region developed in a cooperative and envi-
ronmentally sensitive manner. However, both have begun 
to address important defense issues as well. In June 2009 
both states participated in the NATO exercise Loyal 
Arrow in Swedish Lapland. It involved over 2000 troops, 
50 aircraft, and naval units, including a British aircraft 
carrier. Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO 
but are engaged in its Partnership for Peace Program. 
While there has never been an official statement 
regarding either state‘s desire to join NATO, there is 
increasing discussion in non-official circles of that possi-
bility. In Russia the Putin and Medvedev administrations 
have made it clear in the context of Ukraine and Georgia 
that they view the extension of NATO to their borders as 
unacceptable. It is unlikely that they would view a move 
to accept Finland into the alliance any differently. Thus 
the relationship between Finland and NATO is an issue 
that must be followed closely with regard to geopolitical 
developments in the Arctic region. 
Both Finland and Sweden have also begun to take 
limited steps to modernize their forces. Like Norway, 
Sweden has built a new class of fast missile patrol 
vessels. The Visby-class stealth corvette is a high speed 
(35 knots) vessel designed for anti-ship and anti-missile 
roles. Finland is currently looking to purchase new 
fighter aircraft. There has been some discussion that 
they may follow Norway‘s example and buy the F-35, 
although uncertainty regarding the aircraft’s final price 
tag makes this move unlikely for the foreseeable future. 
Nonetheless, Finland’s interest in bolstering national air 
defenses reveals a concern for their national security as 
the Arctic opens up.
In July 2009 Denmark released details of its plan to 
create both an Arctic military command and an Arctic 
Response Force. Denmark has been modernizing its 
navy since the 1980s when it began to replace most of 
its surface combatants. Between 1985 and 1996 the 
Danish Navy built 11 Flyvefisken-class patrol vessels with 
a modular design that allows them to be configured for 
anti-ship, anti-aircraft, or general patrol missions by 
switching out the respective weapon system for each role. 
In the early 1990s Denmark built four Thesis class frigates 
that can travel through one meter thick, first-year ice and 
have been used in northern patrols around Greenland. In 
2002, one of these frigates landed on Hans Island, where 
troops planted the Danish flag. In one of the few land 
disputes in the Arctic, Hans Island is claimed by both 
Canada and Denmark. The Danish Navy has also built 
two larger Command and Control vessels of the Absalon 
class, designed for a wide range of tasks, including anti-
ship and anti-air missions. These ships carry a helicopter 
and have a “roll on and roll off deck” for transporting 
heavy land vehicles, including battle tanks. Three slightly 
smaller Ivar Huitfeldt-class frigates are under construc-
tion and may be outfitted with harpoon and tomahawk 
missiles, giving them a substantial fighting capability. In 
2008 and 2009, Denmark commissioned two additional 
ice-capable Knud Rasmussen-class patrol vessels. In total, 
the Danes have now developed a very flexible and modern 
navy that can take on a wide range of roles, including a 
strong combat capability. 
The remaining Arctic state, Iceland, has never 
maintained a military because its economy is too small to 
support one. Since it joined NATO during the early days 
of the Cold War, its allies have maintained their forces 
on the island. The United States stationed helicopters 
and four F-15 fighters on the island for many years but 
removed them in 2006, citing nonspecific changes in 
strategic priorities. Consequently, Iceland is the only 
Arctic state that has seen a reduction its armaments in 
recent years, but not of its own doing. Given the current 
economic downturn of the Icelandic economy, there is 
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little likelihood of Iceland building any new forces of 
its own, although its Coast Guard has taken on local 
constabulary duties since the departure of the American 
forces. Discussions are ongoing with Canada, Norway, 
and the United Kingdom regarding possible replace-
ments for the withdrawn American aircraft. 
Upon examination of the overall building programs 
of the Arctic states, several trends emerge. First, most 
are either in the process of rebuilding, or planning to 
rebuild, a portion of their military forces, especially their 
navies. Consistent with prudent military planning, many 
of these states are opting to build combat capable forces: 
Hope for the best and prepare for the worst. But the 
scale and combat nature of many of the new capabilities 
seem to run counter to the statements of all of the Arctic 
states that there is no military threat in the region and 
only constabulary capabilities are required to meet the 
new demands of an open Arctic. Further complicating 
interpretation of the emerging security trends, countries 
such as Denmark, Russia and the United States, are 
designing new forces to be flexible for use both in the 
Arctic and worldwide. But if political cooperation in the 
region should sour in the future, it is clear that most of 
the Arctic nations will have forces that are prepared for a 
hostile northern environment. 
FINDING 5: NON-ARCTIC STATES AND  
ORGANIZATIONS SEEK ROLES IN THE ARCTIC 
Multilateral organizations and non-Arctic states are 
looking for new roles in the Arctic and are attempting to 
come to terms with the meaning of Arctic security. 
Recently, several multilateral bodies, including the EU 
and NATO, have become increasingly interested in the 
Arctic region. Both organizations have been examining 
the issue of governance and security in the region. This 
is not a new topic for NATO as five of the eight Arctic 
states (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and the 
United States) are long-standing members of the organi-
zation. Throughout the Cold War, the alliance’s central 
focus was defending against a Soviet attack in the north. 
The EU has a more limited connection. It is comprised of 
only three Arctic states—Denmark, Finland and Sweden. 
Furthermore, Denmark has an arrangement whereby it 
is a NATO member, but Greenland is not. Nevertheless, 
the EU has begun to develop its own foreign policy for 
the region. 
NATO’s examination of the new developments in 
Arctic security has been limited to conferences and meet-
ings. At this point, the alliance‘s official position is that 
no military threat is developing in the region, as stated 
publicly by NATO’s Secretary General during a January 
2008 meeting of the allies in Iceland. The statement was 
intended to assure Russia that NATO‘s renewed interest 
in the region was not directed against it. However, 
following the NATO meeting, the Russian media was 
especially critical of the alliance. At the same time, some 
of the Arctic NATO members have been careful to draw 
a distinction between their unilateral military actions in 
the region and the alliance. Canada has made it clear that 
its invitations the United States and Denmark to partici-
pate in northern military exercises are strictly bilateral. 
On the other hand, Norway has explicitly connected its 
major northern military exercise with NATO. Hence, 
NATO’s military involvement in the Arctic remains 
somewhat ambiguous, even among its members.
It is too early to determine NATO’s definitive role 
in the Arctic, but it appears to be focused on providing 
better coordination for security-related issues, such as 
search and rescue. Given the importance of the region to 
member states such as Canada, Norway and the United 
States, it seems likely that NATO will remain engaged in 
the Arctic for the long term. 
The EU has approached the issue of Arctic security 
from a governance and environmental security perspec-
tive. Their interest is framed in the context of ensuring 
that the region is open to non-Arctic states and that 
new governance mechanisms are designed to include 
the interests of all European states. They have also 
issued policy statements that place a strong emphasis on 
protecting the environment. 
Apart from the EU, several European member states 
have begun to develop unilateral Arctic security policies. 
France in particular has publicly stated its intentions to 
provide its military with some Arctic capabilities. 
The growing interest of the Asian states in the region 
is attracting the attention of the circumpolar states. 
China in particular has begun to significantly increase 
its scientific capability to study within the Arctic. India 
has also recently begun to express interest in the region. 
So far, no Asian nation has officially noted a geopolitical 
interest in the Arctic, but the fact that China’s Polar 
Research Institute has recently added a department of 
strategic studies suggests that strategic interest in the 
region is growing among non-Arctic states.
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FINDING 6: UNDERLYING CAUSES  
OF POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
Trends in climate change, oil and gas, and shipping have 
drawn the attention of the world’s large economies to 
the Arctic over the past decade. However, the unprec-
edented spate of major Arctic policy statements issued 
between 2008 and 2011 was initiated by two virtually 
simultaneous strategic maneuvers—Russia planting 
its flag at the North Pole in August 2007 and Canada’s 
Arctic military investment announcements the same 
week. These events appeared in magazine covers and 
newspaper headlines worldwide and garnered major 
foreign policy attention. 
The circumpolar states’ renewed focus on the 
Arctic has had a number of underlying causes and has 
influenced each polar state differently, depending on its 
position and government. Principal among these causes 
is the increasing accessibility of Arctic waters resulting 
from global warming and new maritime technologies. 
Accessibility leads to the potential of new sea routes or 
the expansion of old ones, an important issue for both 
Russia and Canada. Sea access involves not only the 
potential gains of commercial shipping, easier resource 
extraction, and increased adventure tourism, but also the 
dangers of pollution, criminal activity, terrorist incur-
sions and increased risk of inter-state conflict. 
Western nations have focused on increasing their 
presence in the region and augmenting their scientific 
research activities, environmental protections, sustain-
able development plans, and their military presence. The 
Scandinavian countries and Canada have long histories 
of preferring to work within the boundaries of interna-
tional law and of settling disputes through negotiation. 
With their membership in NATO, Canada, Denmark, 
Iceland, and Norway demonstrate that they are willing to 
use both the threat of force and actual force if needed. 
Canada and Norway have been most aggressive in 
rebuilding Arctic military capabilities. However, these 
efforts are focused on building constabulary capacity 
and on local combat capabilities. Currently, their main 
focus is to develop a means to respond to the expected 
new interests in the region. By virtue of its great power 
status, the United States has acted in a more unilateral 
basis on many issues, yet its stake in the Arctic is 
comparatively small and it has tended historically to act 
with limited interest in the region. 
Russia is a different case and its Arctic policy should 
be viewed as part of its larger movement to regain 
its former great power status. Under Vladimir Putin, 
Russia has grown more hostile to Western interests 
and more willing to use force to settle disputes near its 
borders; Chechnya and Georgia are obvious examples. 
The planned expansion of the military—particularly 
the strategic rocket forces—demonstrates the strategic 
priority that Russia places on its new oil and gas wealth. 
Russia‘s prosperity rises and falls with oil and the Arctic 
is Russia‘s greatest source of hard currency. As such, 
Moscow has invested tens of billions of dollars in develop-
ments on the Yamal Peninsula, Sakhalin, and the Barents 
Sea projects. Although Russia has stated its intention to 
comply with UNCLOS, its recent policy statements and 
actions suggest that it will act assertively to safeguard its 
oil wealth and strategic position in the Arctic. 
Although oil and gas are less central to the core 
interests of the rest of the circumpolar powers, resource 
extraction is still a driving force behind the renewed 
Arctic interest within these states. With global demand 
growing rapidly and oil becoming increasingly difficult 
to find and extract around the world, prices are likely to 
continue to increase over the next decades. The impor-
tance of Arctic resources will grow accordingly, especially 
if oil production should decline precipitously in any of 
the world‘s politically unstable oil-producing states. 
The current global recession should not greatly affect 
the development of Arctic resources. They were always 
going to be middle- to long-term developments, following 
the progression of sea ice loss. The global economy 
should rebound by the time the oil and gas exploration 
and shipping could be scaled up in the Arctic. China, 
India and the rest of the developing world’s growing 
middle classes will need oil and gas and other resources. 
Thus, global market pressure to bring Arctic oil and gas 
supplies online is likely to rise over the next decades. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Taken as a whole, the Arctic policy statements and 
actions taken by the circumpolar states in recent years 
clearly disprove Hypothesis 1. The Arctic is in transi-
tion and processes—both natural and political—are 
changing the nature of international security in the 
region. An unprecedented amount of effort and atten-
tion is being expended on the issue of Arctic security. 
There is a genuine concern on the part of the circum-
polar states that an increasingly accessible Arctic will 
require new means of protection. 
The Arctic states’ pronouncements and activities 
provide some support for both Hypothesis 2 and  
Hypothesis 3. Every foreign and defense policy or state-
ment that has been released has indicated the Arctic 
states’ intent to develop the Arctic in a cooperative 
and peaceful manner. No state currently perceives an 
immediate military threat in the region, nor expects one 
in the foreseeable future, as all territorial expansions 
are being sought under the terms allowed for under 
UNCLOS. At the same time, however, most of the Arctic 
states have stated clearly that they intend to defend their 
national interests in the region. Russia, Canada and the 
United States have been particularly assertive in this 
regard. Nevertheless, the policies and statements taken 
as a whole, in conjunction with multilateral agreements 
such as the Ilulissat Declaration, suggest that the Arctic 
states are earnestly trying to ensure that the model of 
Arctic security that emerges emphasizes international 
cooperation and respect for international law, backed by 
strengthened state capabilities. 
Although the pursuit of cooperation is the stated 
priority, most of the Arctic states have begun to rebuild and 
modernize their military capabilities in the region. The 
new military programs have been geared towards combat 
capabilities that exceed mere constabulary capacity. 
States, such as Norway and Russia, are building new 
naval units designed to engage in high-intensity conflicts. 
While this capability may be understood as prudent, the 
ability of rivals to intimidate or subdue with sophisticated 
weapons systems could, if collegiality falters, undermine 
diplomacy and stability in the region.
Ultimately, the most confounding element of the 
emerging Arctic security environment is uncertainty. 
The forces that are transforming the Arctic can act in a 
number of unpredictable permutations. The uncertain 
fate of the sea ice will ultimately determine the timing 
and degree of accessibility to the Arctic. The Arctic 
ice cover could vanish more rapidly than anticipated 
or the ice could rebound, although current scientific 
understanding is that the latter is unlikely. Likewise, the 
price of oil could continue to rise to levels that predate 
the current economic crisis or could collapse as it did in 
the late 1980s. Again, the latter is unlikely unless there is 
a major technological/industrial breakthrough in energy 
extraction or a major economic collapse in one or more 
major consumer economies. The price of commodities 
will determine at what point it becomes economically 
feasible to develop the northern resources. The delimita-
tion of the maritime borders in the Arctic Ocean—both 
the existing disputes in the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) and the upcoming disputes over the extended 
continental shelf—could proceed diplomatically, as 
planned, or states could become more assertive and 
ultimately aggressive in defending their claims.
There are many plausible scenarios as to how these 
factors will develop and interact. Therefore, it is difficult 
to determine if the Arctic states’ current preference 
for cooperation can be maintained, or if the security 
capabilities now being built will be increasingly used 
as frustration builds over diplomatic delays or failures. 
It is even more difficult to predict the relationships of 
the Arctic states beyond the Arctic. Will Russia and the 
United States be able to resolve the developing tensions 
regarding NATO expansion or Iran, or will these 
disputes escalate and spill over into their Arctic relation-
ship? Perhaps they will be able to manage and resolve 
these difficult issues, thereby reinforcing the political 
will to handle all issues—including those in the Arctic—
in a cooperative fashion. Likewise, Canada and the 
United States could experience a chill in Arctic relations 
due to deteriorating economic conditions, or improving 
economic conditions could mean that the governments 
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have the political room to make the compromises 
necessary to ensure that the Arctic is managed in a 
cooperative fashion. These issues go beyond the Arctic, 
but are central to the type of security environment that 
will develop there. 
So what can be done? First, given the political 
goodwill that currently prevails, the Arctic states need 
to strengthen existing multilateral institutions and 
agreements, particularly those concerning security. If 
emerging issues can be dealt with before the interests 
of others become entrenched, it is more likely that 
existing goodwill can be maintained. States should also 
consider developing practical bilateral and multilateral 
agreements where their new Arctic capabilities can 
work together, such as the Arctic Search and Rescue 
Agreement and the forthcoming Polar Code, expected 
in 2014. Broader involvement of outside institutions 
with relevant multilateral capabilities would be helpful, 
such as the International Maritime Organization or the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
However, any such effort will need to be sensitive to 
national concerns regarding exclusion. 
The reality is that new military forces are being built. 
If the practice of using these new forces in a cooperative 
fashion develops early, then cooperation may become 
entrenched and maintained even if relations become 
strained outside the Arctic. To move in this direction, the 
Arctic states need to acknowledge the renewal of military 
strength in the Arctic and be willing to deal openly with 
it. This need runs counter to the tendency of the states 
to publicly downplay the potential for military conflict in 
the Arctic in order to emphasize their legitimate desire 
for cooperation. Each of the Arctic nations has provided 
logical reasons for building new military forces and has 
also strongly stated its desire to cooperate. It would be 
beneficial to have a forum where these states can discuss 
and plan how these new capabilities could be used 
cooperatively. A good starting point would be for the 
Arctic Council to eliminate its existing prohibition on 
discussing military security issues. 
Created in 1996, the Arctic Council includes all of 
the Arctic nations as well as six northern aboriginal 
groups recognized as permanent Participants. Observers 
constitute a third level of membership and include both 
non-Arctic states and non-state actors. A further division 
exists between Permanent Observers and ad hoc members 
who are admitted on a year-by-year basis. When it was 
established, the Arctic Council’s mandate explicitly 
excluded military security issues. Recently there has been 
some movement to reconsider this ban. The Council 
has concluded a Search and Rescue treaty involving 
military forces of some member states, demonstrating the 
Council’s ability to address security issues productively. 
Even so, some of the Arctic states continue to resist 
extending the Council’s mandate to military concerns. On 
April 12–13 2012, however, senior military leaders of all 
eight Arctic states met in Gander, Newfoundland, Canada. 
The exact nature of the talks is unknown but the fact that 
this meeting includes all eight Arctic Council members 
suggests possible developments on the security front. 
If the Arctic Council remains resistant to taking 
on military security issues formally, cooperation still 
could be enhanced on a bilateral and multilateral basis. 
Canada, Denmark and the United States commenced 
joint military operations in 2010 and Norway and 
Russia have been conducting similar operations since 
2008. However, care should be taken that alignments 
are perceived as cooperative rather than defensive. 
Exercises such as Norway’s Cold Response exercise with 
other NATO members continue to antagonize Russia. 
Depending on who is cooperating and who is not, ad 
hoc multilateral measures could be counterproductive. 
NATO remains uncertain about its role in the Arctic 
and Russia will continue to look on the alliance with 
suspicion. If Finland or Sweden were to pursue formal 
membership in NATO, it would hurt relations with 
Russia. Thus, the best option to reinforce cooperative 
behavior in the Arctic is to work within or in partnership 
with the Arctic Council. It includes all of the Arctic states 
and has a track record that all of its members respect. 
The Arctic Council also offers formal mechanisms 
for aboriginal groups, such as the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council (ICC), to be heard and considered. Since indig-
enous groups have often partnered with NGOs to oppose 
economic activities and development in their home 
territories, they must be at the table in any regime where 
peaceful cooperation and equitable development are to 
prevail. A related development is the increasing inde-
pendence of the sub-national governments of Greenland 
and Nunavut, who seek greater involvement in regional 
security matters. The Arctic Council represents the best 
vehicle for these groups and sub-national governments to 
engage with the sovereign Arctic states.
Finally, there are broader global implications of 
the emerging Arctic security environment. Here is an 
example of rich, stable countries being increasingly 
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challenged by the consequences of global warming and 
the prospect of developing largely untapped sources of 
hydrocarbons. If climate change has the potential to 
shake the collegiality of long-time friends and rivals who 
survived the Cold War without a direct military conflict, 
imagine what it might do in regions such as the Middle 
East and Africa that are already highly vulnerable to 
climate impacts and already struggle with widespread 
instability. The lesson to the rest of the world might be: 
Look out for changes and adapt and/or react as soon as 
possible, using new and existing diplomatic tools, before 
core national or sub-national interests take center stage 
and promote competition and possibly intra- or inter-
state conflict. 
With global warming, time is of the essence, not only 
for mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, but even 
more so for adaptation at both the international and 
community levels. Adapting in part by using new and 
existing diplomatic mechanisms is one of the best ways to 
ensure international cooperation in limiting the negative 
impacts of global climate change, as well as exploiting 
whatever opportunities the changing climate may offer.
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ANNEX: SURVEY OF RECENT ARCTIC SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
This section catalogues recent policy and commerce 
developments that are shaping the emerging Arctic 
Security environment. The information is organized 
as separate security briefs for circumpolar states, Asia, 
multi-lateral organizations/agreements, and industry. 
CIRCUMPOLAR STATES
Canada 
Over the past decade, and particularly since 2005, the 
Arctic has come to play an increasingly prominent role 
in Canadian policy, as the Prime Minister’s Office, the 
Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs, and a host 
of other federal departments have moved the region to 
the top of their agendas. In large measure, this has been 
a reaction to the improved accessibility of the North, the 
enhanced potential of hydrocarbon extraction, and the 
reemergence of traditional questions of sovereignty.
Canada has traditionally relied upon a cooperative 
rules-based approach to Arctic policy and continues to 
emphasize the importance of the Arctic Council, the 
United Nations, and bi-national partnerships with other 
circumpolar powers. Over the past decade, The Northern 
Dimension of Canadian Foreign Policy, the International 
Policy Statement, Canada’s Northern Strategy, Statement on 
Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, and other official Canadian 
speeches and pronouncements have emphasized the 
need to work cooperatively on issues of common concern 
such as environmental monitoring, local self-government, 
transportation, and scientific research (Canada 2000, 
2005, 2009, 2010).
In the past five years, however, Canadian policy 
increasingly emphasizes unilateral action and force 
projection into the Arctic. Canada’s principal Northern 
security concern is the status of the waters of the 
Northwest Passage. The Canadian government considers 
the passage to be internal waters by virtue of the state’s 
historic title and by baselines drawn around the entire 
Arctic Archipelago in 1985 (Dufresne 2007). Yet, this 
claim is expressly challenged in the 2008 American 
Arctic policy statement, which characterizes the waters as 
straits used for international navigation (President of the 
United States 2009).
Canada and the United States have been able to avoid 
a serious dispute over this issue through a 1988 bilateral 
Arctic cooperation agreement, which suspends the ques-
tion of sovereignty while allowing American icebreakers 
to transit the Northwest Passage (Canada-United States 
1989). However, this agreement does not cover other 
vessel types and the consequences of a conventional 
vessel passing through these waters without Canadian 
permission remains a serious concern. Canada also has a 
maritime dispute with the United States in the Beaufort 
Sea, an area potentially rich in oil and gas, as well as 
boundary disputes with Denmark in the Lincoln Sea and 
over tiny Hans Island in the Nares Strait.
Ottawa’s concern over its position in the Arctic has 
been demonstrated by a series of new projects, begun 
or announced since 2005, which aim to enhance the 
capability of Canadian military and civilian authorities 
to operate in the region. The Royal Canadian Navy is 
expected to receive its first armed Arctic patrol craft 
in 2016 and the aging Coast Guard icebreaker Louis 
St. Laurent is scheduled to be replaced by the $720 
million John G. Diefenbaker, which is being designed by a 
Canadian shipbuilder and is expected to be operational 
by 2017 (Prime Minister of Canada 2008). To supply 
these vessels, a new military and civilian deep-water 
resupply facility is also being constructed at Nanisivik on 
Baffin Island, with a projected operational date of 2016 
(Prime Minister of Canada 2007). 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper has also announced 
an Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay for the Army, 
intended to support regional military and civilian 
emergency operations, to increase capabilities, and 
to quicken response times (Prime Minister of Canada 
2007). The Canadian Ranger force is also being 
augmented with better equipment and increased recruit-
ment. Meanwhile, regular CF forces continue annual 
joint-exercise in the region.
In addition, the Canadian military is actively seeking 
to increase its surveillance capability over the region 
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with manned and unmanned aircraft. It is also in the 
process of establishing its ‘Northern Watch’ system, 
which uses both land-based and underwater sensors 
to detect vessels passing through choke points in 
the Northwest Passage  (MacLeod, McCallum and 
Waller 2009). The Polar Epsilon satellite system has 
also provided Canada with a new space-based surveil-
lance system designed in part to monitor the ocean 
approaches of the Arctic (National Defence Canada 
2009). At present this system is slated for expansion with 
a constellation of three RADARSAT satellites planned 
for near-continuous coverage of the North.
In a further attempt to increase Canadian control 
over Arctic waters, the government announced in August 
2008 that the Coast Guard’s Northern reporting system 
(NORDREG) has been made mandatory for all vessels in 
the Canadian Arctic (Prime Minister of Canada 2008b). 
At the same time, Ottawa announced the extension of its 
jurisdictional limit from 100 to 200 nautical miles under 
the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (Department of 
Justice Canada 2010).
Canada is also interested in developing its Northern 
oil and gas reserves. Beginning in 2007, oil companies 
began investing heavily in exploration leases and the 
Canadian government is on record supporting the 
construction of the $16 billion Mackenzie Valley pipe-
line. In an effort to expand its Northern resource base, 
Ottawa is actively engaged in hydrographic mapping of 
the Arctic shelf, a project which must be completed by 
2013 to meet its U.N. deadline. It is working cooperatively 
with both Denmark and the United States on this effort 
(Natural Resources Canada 2009).
Canadian policy remains based upon the assumption 
that Arctic territorial and legal disputes can be solved 
by diplomatic means and with respect for international 
law. However it has taken serious measures to ensure 
that, in the future, it will have the physical capabilities 
to project and sustain a government presence in the 
region, enforce Canadian law, and ensure respect for its 
national sovereignty.
Denmark 
Denmark’s link to the Arctic is through its relationship 
with Greenland. Although Greenland, a former Danish 
colony, achieved Home Rule in 1979 and Self Rule 
in 2009, Copenhagen retains certain administrative 
responsibilities over Greenland, notably in foreign and 
defense issues. 
Denmark announced its Arctic policy, the Kingdom 
of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020, in August 
2011, and established a new Ambassadorship for the 
Arctic in January 2012 (Governments of Denmark, 
Faroes and Greenland 2011). Security is one priority, but 
not the priority, of the Danish policy, which focuses on 
environmental protection, international cooperation, 
and sustainable development. Where it does mention 
sovereignty and defense, it is in reference to the Danish 
Defence Agreement 2010–2014, a policy document which is 
much more explicit about Arctic security (Government 
of Denmark 2009). In relation to the Arctic, the Danish 
Defence Agreement specifies that 1) the Armed Forces North 
Atlantic command structure will be streamlined by the 
amalgamation of the Greenland Command and the 
Faroe Command into a joint service Arctic Command; 
2) an Arctic Response Force will be established; 3) a risk 
analysis of the maritime environment in and around 
Greenland will be conducted in light of the anticipated 
expansion of activities in the area; and 4) towards 2014 a 
comprehensive analysis of the armed forces’ future tasks 
in the Arctic is to be carried out, including opportunities 
and potential for closer cooperation with partner coun-
tries in the Arctic concerning surveillance and the future 
role of the Thule Air Base (Government of Denmark 
2009). In its various Arctic security policy statements and 
speeches, Denmark has focused on search and rescue, 
surveillance and maintenance of territorial sovereignty, 
fishery protection, and oil spill reaction. Furthermore, 
the Danish armed forces are going through a moderniza-
tion of their capabilities. Their navy took delivery of three 
ice-strengthened, Thetis-class frigates in the early 1990s. 
In the middle 2000s the navy took command of two new 
Absalon-class Combat/Flexible Support Ships of relatively 
large size (6,300 tonnes). 
Global warming and the resultant economic opportu-
nities in oil drilling, shipping and mineral exploitation 
have paved the way for greater autonomy and, poten-
tially, independence for Greenland. These opportunities 
give Greenlanders hope of replacing the current subsidy 
from Denmark with oil revenues in the future. The 
decision of the Greenlandic government to exploit its 
offshore oil resources has caused some division among 
Inuit, but it has continued to encourage exploration but 
awarding several licenses to explore off its west coast. 
Cairns Energy began exploratory drilling in 2010, but 
has not announced a commercial discovery. 
Denmark and Greenland’s strong interest in the 
peaceful and timely settling of UNCLOS claims in the 
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region led to the convening of the five Arctic Ocean 
coastal states in Ilulissat in 2008 at the invitation of both 
the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Premier 
of Greenland. Although Denmark’s influence in the 
Arctic has been marginal, this was probably the single-
most consequential event for the governance of the 
region since the inauguration of the Arctic Council. 
Finland 
Finland was an early proponent of Arctic cooperation. 
It initiated the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy, which became the precursor to the Arctic 
Council. Finland also proposed the Northern Dimension 
for the EU, which was adopted soon after the 1999 Finnish 
EU presidency, and spearheaded the formulation of a new 
Northern Dimension policy during its 2006 EU presidency. 
Finland’s long border, and history, with Russia 
explains its preoccupation with international Arctic 
affairs. Perhaps more than any other country, Finland 
is vulnerable to the social and environmental problems 
faced by Russia in its northwest region, which the EU 
Northern Dimension policies are meant to mitigate. 
Finland is also strongly interested in promoting links 
and cooperation between Russia and the West so as not 
to repeat the tensions of the Cold War era, felt so acutely 
in Helsinki. This made it all the more surprising that 
Finland came so late in the line-up of national Arctic 
strategies, announcing its own policy for the region on 
June 4, 2010. However, it reflects the relatively recent 
shift of circumpolar relations in the 2000s from a focus 
on environmental cooperation and engagement with 
Russia to economic and strategic concerns related to 
the opening of the Arctic Ocean. Although Finland 
is not a coastal state of the Arctic Ocean, it does have 
interests related to the development of a trans-Arctic 
shipping regime and future hydrocarbon exploitation 
based on its expertise in the fields of Arctic construction, 
Arctic environmental technology, and ship-building for 
transportation and navigation in ice-covered waters. 
Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region concentrates on 
seven priority sectors: security, environment, economy, 
infrastructure, indigenous peoples, institutions, and 
the European Union (Finland Prime Minister’s Office 
2010). Its discussion on security is very general, and 
couched in terms of promoting regional cooperation 
and multilateral security arrangements with NATO and 
the Nordic countries. Its 2009 defense policy is almost 
as vague, with no description of upcoming military 
acquisitions or exercises. However, it does refer to the 
Arctic several times and iterates that the “promotion of 
security and stability in Northern Europe is a key goal of 
Finland’s security and defense policy” (Finland Prime 
Minister’s Office 2009). It further states that “Nordic 
defence cooperation may identify security-enhancing 
means of collaboration and projects which, in the long 
term, create savings and synergies. However, Nordic 
cooperation is no surrogate for closer EU or NATO 
cooperation” and “strong grounds exist for considering 
Finland’s membership of NATO,” an indication that 
Finnish membership in NATO is being discussed more 
seriously than before. Through the Partnership for Peace 
Program, Finland has begun to conduct military opera-
tions with NATO in the region (Sullivan 2009).
Iceland 
Iceland has been influential in the Arctic relative to 
its size and population, and conducted perhaps the 
most productive and successful Chairmanship of the 
Arctic Council in 2002–04, during which time the 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and Arctic Human 
Development Report were released. It has also sponsored 
the Northern Research Forum and meetings such as 
the 2007 Breaking the Ice conference for the Arctic 
Council‘s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment and the 
NATO Summit on the Arctic held in January 2009.
The importance of the High North in Iceland was first 
formally outlined in a report delivered to the Icelandic 
Parliament in November 2007, whereby the Foreign 
Minister declared that the High North was a new core 
feature of Icelandic foreign policy (Iceland Minister 
of Foreign Affairs 2007b). Iceland followed up with an 
official Arctic strategy in April 2009, and a parliamentary 
resolution on the Arctic in March 2011 (Government of 
Iceland 2009, Althingi 2011). Security is a priority, but 
is communicated primarily in terms of international 
cooperation and stability. No specific military or 
constabulary investments or activities are outlined. The 
Parliamentary resolution section on security discusses 
safeguarding broadly defined security interests through 
civilian means and working against any kind of milita-
rization of the Arctic. It mentions the environmental 
protection, observation capabilities, search and rescue, 
and pollution prevention as avenues for circumpolar 
security cooperation (Althingi 2011). 
That said, there can be no doubt that Arctic security 
is an important concern to Iceland. Being a small and 
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isolated country, Iceland is reliant on its neighbors and 
friends to ensure its security. From this perspective, the 
emergence of a new geopolitical regime in the Arctic 
poses both a threat and an opportunity. 
From 1951 to 2006, the United States provided for 
the defense of Iceland through the Iceland Defense 
Force (IDF), headquartered in Keflavík through the 
deployment of American air assets, including helicopters 
and fighter aircraft. The 1951 US-Icelandic Defense 
Agreement was established at the urging of NATO 
during the early years of the Cold War, when Iceland, 
which has no military force of its own, was situated in 
a particularly strategic location in the North Atlantic. 
Given the new security realities of the 21st Century, 
the United States unexpectedly announced its decision 
to withdraw the IDF in March 2006, a task that was 
completed by September of that year (Garamone 2006). 
American officials were vague about the reasons for 
withdrawing military assets from Iceland, citing general 
changes in the global strategic environment (White 
2006). Within months after the United States announced 
its withdrawal, the Icelandic Coast Guard assumed 
responsibility for security, search and rescue, and law 
enforcement activities at sea (Iceland Ministry of the 
Interior 2006). 
While the bilateral Defense Agreement with the USA 
remains in effect, Iceland has sought other partnerships 
in order to ensure that its defense and security needs 
are met. The cornerstone of its new security policy is 
its membership in NATO, which has offered Iceland a 
limited air policing arrangement since 2008. Iceland 
has further signed bilateral defense Memoranda of 
Understanding in the North Atlantic with Denmark, 
the United Kingdom, and Norway, and participates in 
the Nordic Defence Cooperation (Iceland Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 2007, NORDEFCO 2009). Commitments 
from Norway and the United Kingdom have been 
particularly important. 
Furthermore, Iceland applied for membership to 
the EU in May 2009, and full negotiations are now 
underway. Although the EU is not a military alliance, 
the Lisbon Treaty introduced mutual assistance and 
solidarity clauses. 
The cross Atlantic relationship with the United 
States is not dead. The two countries have continued 
to participate in the Northern Viking exercises—most 
recently in 2008 and 2011—intended to train the NATO 
allies to defend Iceland. More than 400 foreign troops 
participated in Northern Viking 2008. The Icelandic 
Coast Guard contributed two SAR helicopters and 
the allies combined provided 15 fighter planes, three 
refueling planes, and two E3 AWACS planes; four of 
the fighters and the three refueling planes were from 
the U.S. Air Force. For the maritime defense exercise, 
Iceland contributed one Aegis class patrol vessel and one 
helicopter, the Royal Danish Navy provided one Thesis 
class frigate, and the U.S. Navy provided two P-3 Orion 
ASW aircraft (Benediktsson 2011). 
Iceland is expected to submit a new national security 
policy in June 2012, which will likely be heavily influenced 
by the current security environment of the Arctic region. 
Norway 
Of all the Arctic states, Norway has the most developed 
Arctic policy. Its involvement in circumpolar affairs has 
been high since the Norwegian governing coalition 
issued the Soria Moria Declaration in 2005 established 
the “Northern Areas” as Norway’s most important stra-
tegic target area, and adopted the 2006–2009 chairman-
ship of the Arctic Council (Government of Norway 2005). 
The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy was 
issued on December 1, 2006 (Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2006). The first priority states that 
Norway “will exercise [its] authority in the High North in 
a credible, consistent and predictable way” and focuses 
on the exercising of sovereignty and the presence of 
armed forces. The other priorities include environmental 
stewardship, resource development, international 
cooperation, cooperation with Russia, and cultural 
safeguarding. 
The 2008 Norwegian defense document reinforces 
that commitment, stating that the northern regions are 
Norway‘s prime area for strategic investment (Norwegian 
Ministry of Defence 2008). Their importance is linked to 
Norway‘s position as a significant energy exporter and as 
a country responsible for the administration of impor-
tant natural resources extending over large sea areas. 
To that end, Norway has been modernizing its Coast 
Guard and is establishing radar stations and open-water 
monitoring facilities in the Barents and Norwegian seas 
as a response to Russia‘s heightened military activities 
in the region. Norway is also one of very few countries 
that have been boosting defense spending in the wake 
of the global recession, with the government continuing 
to strengthen Norway‘s naval, land, and air defense 
capabilities in the High North and in areas bordering 
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Russia (O’Dwyer 2008). In particular, the Norwegian 
government has focused on improving its maritime and 
air force capabilities. This includes the construction of 
five new frigates built in Spanish shipyards that have 
been given an Aegis combat system, and the decision 
to buy 48 F-35 strike fighters, announced in November 
2008 (Lunde 2006, Wall and Warwick 2008). Norway also 
developed a class of six very fast (over 100 knots) Skjold-
class missile boats designed for anti-ship and anti-aircraft 
combat missions in coastal waters; four have been built 
and delivered (Naval-technology.com 2012, 2012b). 
On March 12, 2009, Norway announced an update 
to its High North Strategy—New Building Blocks in the 
North (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). 
The updated policy was announced at a high-level press 
conference that included the Prime Minister and the 
Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Fisheries, and 
Transport. Among other things, the announcement 
promised increased investments in communications, 
shipping routes, and harbors in the north, and the 
establishment of an international centre of research on 
climate change and the environment in the High North 
in Tromsø. 
Finally, Norway released a White Paper on the High North 
in November 2011, outlining its long term vision for the 
region (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). 
Beginning by assessing the lessons learned and progress 
made between 1990–2010, as regional cooperation began 
in earnest, it then looks at the issues that will dominate 
the next 20 years of circumpolar relations, including oil 
and gas development, industrialization of the North, 
integrated marine management, the growing activity in 
the Arctic Ocean, and a deepening of international coop-
eration in and geopolitical importance of the Arctic.
Norway has been consistent in advocating for stability 
and cooperation in the Arctic, and has chastised rather 
than engaged in the heated rhetoric, primarily between 
Russia and Canada, of the past five years. The resolution 
of the decades-long boundary dispute with Russia in 
the Barents Sea in 2010, and joint naval exercises with 
the Russians—POMOR 2010 and 2011—demonstrate 
its pursuit of broad regional cooperation. However 
it continues to take seriously its preparations for the 
defense of the High North, hosting five Operation Cold 
Response exercises in its Nordlands regions since 2006. 
Though technically led by Norway, the exercises are 
open only to NATO members. The 2009 version was a 
thinly veiled practice run for a Russian incursion, with 
populous and powerful ‘Northland’ attacking poor 
‘Midland’ over oil. The exercise in 2012 continued to 
draw criticism from the Russian governments as being 
overtly provocative (Pettersen 2012). In April 2012, 
the Norwegians have also announced that they will be 
re-equipping one of their existing military land units as 
an Arctic battalion (Pettersen 2012b).
Russia 
Russia is the world’s largest Arctic state and, with roughly 
two million Arctic inhabitants, possesses by far the 
largest Northern population. The Arctic region has 
been an important contributor to the Russian economy 
since the discovery of Siberian oil in the 1960s. In large 
measure, the recovery of the Russian economy over the 
past decade, as well as its continued health, has been and 
remains directly related to the export of oil and gas. By 
law, Russian oil and gas is considered a strategic resource 
and development is heavily controlled by the central 
government. All told, the industry accounts for roughly 
20% of the country’s GDP, with fully 22% of the nation’s 
export earnings being produced in the Arctic. The tax 
revenue from the state-owned gas company Gazprom 
makes up roughly 25% of Russia’s federal tax revenue. 
Despite this control, Russian energy resources have 
been opening up to foreign investment. The need 
for foreign capital and expertise in Arctic operations 
led to a major 2011 partnership between Rosneft and 
ExxonMobil to develop blocks in the Kara Sea. Exxon 
will however only be a minority shareholder, with a 33% 
stake in the venture. This deal is part of the principal 
thrust of Russian Arctic policy, which has been the 
expansion of its Northern resource base. Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev, a former head of Gazprom, 
has publicly described the use of Arctic resources as 
central to the country’s energy security, stating: “Our 
first and main task is to turn the Arctic into Russia’s 
resource base of the 21st century” (Seattle Times news 
services 2008). Both the state’s September 2008 Arctic 
policy and May 2009 state security policy emphasize the 
growing energy potential of the North and the impor-
tance of its development (Russian Security Council 2008, 
Arctic Focus 2009).
The majority of the Arctic’s undeveloped hydrocar-
bons, which Russian and international companies are 
investing billions of dollars to develop, are located in 
the offshore areas on the continental shelf (Gautier, et 
al. 2009). The Russian shelf is estimated to possess vast 
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amounts of oil and gas and Moscow is sparing no effort to 
map the region and claim as much undersea territory as 
possible. During one mapping expedition in 2007, Russia 
created an international sensation by planting its flag on 
the seafloor at the North Pole. Russia is attempting to 
stake its claim to an extended continental shelf under the 
guidelines of UNCLOS and the government will make a 
revised claim sometime in 2012, after initial submissions 
were rejected for a lack of information.
Russia’s Transport Minister Igor Levitin has also 
stated Moscow’s desire to substantially increase maritime 
traffic along the Northern Sea Route, also known as the 
Northeast Passage (Pettersen 2009). The potential for 
increased shipping generated by the Arctic’s thinning 
ice is reflected in ship orders. A large number of liquid 
natural gas and oil tankers with ice-breaking capability 
have been ordered by oil and gas companies, and the 
Russian government has announced plans to order four 
to six nuclear powered icebreakers by the year 2020. 
Russia has been working within the boundaries of 
international law in its attempts to expand its continental 
shelf. Russia’s submissions and supplementary informa-
tion for an extended continental shelf in the Arctic have 
been provided to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf. Furthermore, through its support of 
the Ilulissat declaration and various public pronounce-
ments, Russia has repeatedly exhibited a preference for 
resolving Arctic disputes through diplomatic channels. 
In 2011 Russia and Norway reached such an agreement 
to settle their disputed maritime border in the Barents 
Sea and clarify oil and gas rights in that area. However, 
policy documents and pronouncements by both political 
and military leaders make it plain that Russia considers 
military force an acceptable means of defending what it 
considers its Arctic interests.
To this end, Russia has greatly increased its military 
presence in the North over the past five years. It has 
resumed strategic bomber flights over the Arctic Ocean 
and the Norwegian Sea in recent years. In 2008 the 
Russian Navy announced that its fleet had “resumed a 
warship presence in the Arctic” (javno100 2008). Moscow 
has also declared an increase in the operational radius 
of its northern submarine fleet to include much of the 
Arctic Ocean. This is in keeping with the high priority 
placed upon the Arctic by the maritime doctrine adopted 
under former President Vladamir Putin (Russian 
Federation 2001). This increase in military activity has 
certainly not gone unnoticed; In 2010 the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store, commented that 
“Norway has been observing an expansion of Russian 
activities in its northern territories that involve warships, 
planes and its submarine fleet operations for some time” 
(NATO 2010).
The Russian ability to project power into the Arctic 
has strengthened over the past five years and will likely 
increase in the near future. Russian defense budgets 
have been increasing rapidly in the 21st century and a 
large portion of this new money has been earmarked for 
the Navy. The Navy is currently building its next-generation 
Borey and Yasen class nuclear submarines; ten of each 
are expected to be built as part of the state armaments 
program through 2015 (RIA Novosti 2008). In addition 
to what was announced in that plan, the Russian govern-
ment has begun work on the first of four French Mistral 
class amphibious assault ships. Capable of carrying 16 
attack helicopters and two hovercrafts to deliver troops 
to shore, the Mistral has caused concern among Russia’s 
Baltic and Scandinavian neighbors. On the ground 
the Russian military has begun to assemble two Army 
brigades and Special Forces units that will specialize in 
Arctic warfare and guard oil and gas infrastructure and 
Russian interests in the region.
In part to support its hard-line position in the region, 
Moscow has become increasingly antagonistic in its 
relations with the West. The state’s national security 
policy has labeled the United States a “main rival,” while 
Russian state-owned newspapers have increasingly criti-
cized the United States and NATO, accusing the West of 
coveting Russian resources and attempting to militarize 
the North (APA 2008).
Securing and developing the Arctic’s resources, 
particularly the oil and gas reserves, are the principal 
aims of Russian Arctic policy. While Russian action 
in the Arctic has remained within the boundaries of 
international law, the state is prepared to act unilaterally 
if it perceives its Arctic interests to be threatened.
Sweden 
Sweden announced its Strategy for the Arctic Region in 
May 2011, shortly after it assumed the chairmanship of 
the Arctic Council (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2011). Of all the Arctic states, Sweden has been the least 
engaged in matters of circumpolar relations or Arctic 
security. The reasons for this are linked to geography, 
as Sweden shares neither a border with Russia nor a 
coastline with the Arctic Ocean, and therefore has fewer 
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security and economic interests in its North. Its main 
goals, as reflected in its policy and its Arctic Council 
chairmanship agenda, revolve around environmental 
and climate concerns. However, Sweden’s security policy 
position based on “security in cooperation” means that 
the security policies of the EU Member States and Nordic 
countries strongly influence Swedish security policy. 
While its participation in the Arctic Council has been 
comparatively limited, Sweden has been active in other 
regional organizations, including the Nordic Council, 
the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the EU, and it has 
established an Arctic Ambassadorship. Its defense and 
security policy emphasizes cooperation with the Nordic 
countries and the EU and there is broad political support 
in Sweden for further development of bilateral and 
multilateral Nordic military cooperation. There are also 
signs that Sweden is moving towards greater cooperation 
with NATO, causing some observers to speculate that it 
may be moving towards joining the alliance (Simpson 
2009). In June 2009, for example, Sweden hosted a large 
NATO military exercise—Loyal Arrow—under the terms 
of the Partnership for Peace Programme in its northern 
region of Lapland (Sullivan 2009). It involved over 50 
aircraft and 2000 troops from Finland, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Following the announcement of the French sale of the 
Mistral to Russia, Swedish Defence Minister Sten Tolgfors 
stated that the sale will necessitate that Sweden develop 
a strong air force with sea targeting capabilities as well 
as strengthening Swedish submarine forces (Nilsen 
2011). The Swedish government is also investing in the 
development of a very technologically advanced warship: 
The Visby class corvette is one of the world‘s first stealth 
warships, made of advanced composite materials and 
capable of speeds of over 35 knots. It is a small vessel that 
has been given a very powerful anti-submarine, anti-air 
and anti-ship capability (Naval-technology.com 2012c). 
Five such vessels are planned. 
Sweden has recently eliminated its draft and is now 
moving to a smaller and more professional armed forces. 
The Swedish Chief of Defence Staff said the move was 
intended to give the Swedish forces greater international 
mobility, including a greater ability to operate in the 
High North (O’Dwyer 2010).
The United States of America 
In January 2009 the United States released a compre-
hensive Arctic policy, elucidating the state’s interest 
in protecting the region’s environment, developing its 
natural resources, and maintaining national security 
(President of the United States 2009). This policy state-
ment demonstrates the growing importance of the Arctic 
in American policy, driven principally by the increasing 
accessibility of the Arctic waters and the improving 
prospects for gas and oil extraction.
Resource extraction plays a large role in the American 
interest in the region, as the past seven years have seen 
the major oil companies purchasing large oil explora-
tion permits in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas and 
commencing significant seismic exploration in these 
areas. The recent U.S. policy statement also restates 
the American position regarding its boundary dispute 
with Canada in the Beaufort Sea, and emphasized the 
importance of ratifying UNCLOS to secure U.S. control 
over the resources of the continental shelf north of 
Alaska. The U.S. Coast Guard has been carrying out 
hydrographic surveys of that region in preparation for 
just such a claim.
These developments have been made possible by the 
increased accessibility of the region through the melting 
of the Arctic ice. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, as well 
as U.S. Northern Command, have expressed concern 
over the consequences of increased traffic in the Arctic 
waters. The Coast Guard has called for a larger presence 
in the form of icebreakers, a northern base, improved 
oil spill and disaster response capacity, more search 
and rescue equipment, and an improved surveillance 
capability. At present, the U.S. Coast Guard has only 
three icebreakers; the USCG Healy is a modern vessel 
devoted mainly to Arctic research, while the other two, 
the Polar Star and Polar Sea, are out of service. The lack of 
American icebreakers has forced the United States to rely 
increasingly on Russian icebreakers and ice-strengthened 
oil tankers for use in both Alaskan waters and to provide 
for their resupply in Antarctica (Robson 2012, Associated 
Press 2012). 
This sentiment is echoed by the military, which 
plans to increase surveillance with both manned and 
unmanned aircraft. Since the 1950s the U.S. Navy has 
maintained the capability of operating in the Arctic 
waters and the thinning of the ice has made an expan-
sion of its operations there increasingly likely. The Navy 
has been considering the implications of an ice-free 
Arctic for more than a decade (Office of Naval Research 
2001). In 2009 the Navy released its Arctic Roadmap which 
reiterated the country’s tradition objectives of seeking 
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cooperation in the Arctic while maintaining its capacity 
to act independently to protect the freedom of the seas 
and American interests (U.S. Navy 2009). As maritime 
traffic and resource extraction increase, the Navy will 
likely increase the tempo of its submarine patrols—
which have continued and been given increasing 
publicity—and perhaps even deploy surface assets to the 
Northern waters.
The US has begun to increase the visibility of its 
submarine forces’ Arctic voyages. Initially, its newest 
attack submarines (SSN), the Virginia class, were 
not have capabilities to operate in ice-covered waters 
(Federation of American Scientists 2010). However, 
photographs have been released to the public showing 
two Virginia Class submarines—the USS Texas and the 
USS New Hampshire—surfaced through thick Arctic ice 
(COMSUBPAC 2009, COMSUBFOR 2011, IBT 2011). 
Hence, either the U.S. Navy is operating these vessels at 
high risk, a very unlikely scenario, or the initial decision 
to forego ice capabilities was reversed at some point. The 
stated reasons for their Arctic voyages are to assist in the 
conduct of scientific research and to provide military 
training opportunities for operating in the region. 
Increased U.S. operations in the region run the risk 
of political conflict with both Canada and Russia, which 
consider large sections of the Arctic to be their internal 
waters. The United States has never recognized these 
claims and continues to regard the Canadian Northwest 
Passage, as well as the Russian Dmitrii, Vilkiskiy, Laptev 
and Sannikov straits, as international. Moreover, the 
United States has challenged these claims in the past. In 
the case of the Northwest Passage, it refused to request 
permission for transit of the SS Manhattan in 1969 and 
the Polar Sea in 1985. In the case of Russia (then the 
USSR), this challenge came from the deployment of the 
icebreakers Edesto and Eastwind in 1967 to transit the 
Vilkiskiy Straits without permission. The United States 
does, however, have an Arctic cooperation agreement with 
Canada which states: “The Government of the United 
States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers 
within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will 
be undertaken with the consent of the Government of 
Canada.” This agreement does not provide for the passage 
of conventional surface ships, however.
American insistence that Arctic straits constitute 
“straits used for international navigation,” is explicitly 
stated in their official policy. The policy also states, 
“freedom of the seas is a top national priority.” 
Consequently, the United States sees Arctic “waterways” 
simultaneously as territorial seas of Russia and Canada 
and as straits used for international navigation. Under 
this position, the United States believes that rules for 
transit of the straits by foreign-flagged vessels should be 
adopted at the International Maritime Organization, but 
this position is rejected by Canada and Russia.
Diplomatic tension has also resulted by Russian 
objection to American deployment of AEGIS warships 
equipped with antiballistic missile defense systems to 
northern waters. If positioned in the Barents Sea, such 
American warships could in theory shoot down Russian 
ballistic missiles, limiting the Russian nuclear deter-
rence. Recently, the Russian Government has become 
more vocal in its concerns about American intentions in 
this regard (Staalesen 2012). 
Despite the capability and stated willingness to act 
unilaterally in defense of American interests, U.S. policy 
continues to consider multilateral cooperation as the 
preferred means of dealing with most Arctic issues. The 
United States is a signatory of the Ilulisaat Declaration, 
pledged to resolve boundary difficulties within the 
legal framework of UNCLOS, and government policy 
statements have emphasized this cooperative approach 
(Ilulissat Declaration 2008). American policy also recog-
nizes the utility of international cooperation in Arctic 
research and environmental protection, and through the 
Arctic Council. However, U.S. policy emphasizes that the 
council should stay “within its limited mandate of environ-
mental protection and sustainable development” and not 
become involved in matters of defense or state policy.
American Arctic policy is largely governed by the 
state’s desire to see an orderly and environmentally 
sound development of the region’s hydrocarbon reserves, 
the establishment of transit rights through the Arctic 
straits, and the assurance of national security from 
terrorist, criminal, or state based threats in the region.
ASIA 
Asian interest in the Arctic has been on the rise, 
particularly from China, Japan, India and South Korea. 
All have established research stations in Ny-Ålesund, on 
the island of Spitsbergen, Norway, and China (2007), 
South Korea (2008), and Japan (2009), have made formal 
applications to become permanent observers in the 
Arctic Council—a status already accorded the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, and 
Spain. The issue has confounded the consensus-based 
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Arctic Council, and a decision on these applications 
has been tabled at both the 2009 and 2011 Ministerial 
meetings. It is speculated that Canada and Russia are 
most opposed to opening up the Council to a larger and 
more powerful audience of observers. Also, a cooling 
in Chinese-Norwegian relations following the awarding 
of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu 
Xiaobo has led to the loss of Norway as an advocate for 
broadening observership in the Arctic Council. 
There are three main reasons for Asian interest in the 
North. The first is access to new and untapped mineral 
and hydrocarbon resources, as Asian countries seek to 
secure energy and resource supplies for their growing 
and increasingly wealthy populations (much as China 
has done in Africa). Second is shipping. For China, 
this driver is primarily strategic, as it seeks to diversify 
its supply and trade routes, particularly by reducing its 
reliance on shipping through the Straits of Malacca and 
the Lombok Strait. The shorter distance between China 
and the West offered by a trans-Arctic shipping route is 
also attractive. 
For South Korea and Japan, the driver is primarily 
economic. Both are interested in trans-Arctic shipping 
for their export-based economies. South Korea hosts the 
world’s largest shipyards and stands to gain from a new 
market for ice-capable vessels. Japan has a strong interest 
in diversifying its supply of rare earths, on which China 
has a near monopoly; Greenland, in particular, looks to 
be rich in mineral resources essential to the production 
of electronics and other high-value goods. 
The third interest is scientific. The Asian states 
are legitimately interested in climate change and are 
pursuing Arctic research to improve understanding 
of its causes and consequences. Icebreakers that Japan 
(Shirase) and South Korea (Araon) acquired in 2009, and 
that China will launch in 2014, are all research vessels.
MULTI-LATERAL ORGANIZATIONS/AGREEMENTS 
Arctic Council 
The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental 
forum that provides the eight circumpolar countries 
(Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, 
Sweden, and the United States), six Arctic Indigenous 
organizations (as Permanent Participants—Aleut 
International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, 
Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference, Russian Association of Indigenous People 
of the North, and Saami Council) and other observers 
with the means to deal with common Arctic issues. 
The primary focus of the Arctic Council is sustain-
able development and environmental protection. The 
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 
signed in September 1996 in Ottawa, explicitly states 
as an asterisk that “the Arctic Council should not deal 
with matters related to military security” (Arctic Council 
1996). At that time the circumpolar states agreed that 
such matters were better handled in forums such as 
NATO or the Helsinki Process, although the Indigenous 
groups differed with that position. As a result, as far as 
military security issues are concerned, the multilateral 
Arctic practice is to remain silent. 
This position has become somewhat of an obstacle 
in the light of current political realities, in particular 
the escalation of Arctic regional military activities and 
investments. In the interests of communication and 
transparency, it may be in the interests of the members of 
the Arctic Council to now amend this stipulation to allow 
for discussions on the remilitarization of the Arctic. 
There is now a useful precedent for moving in this 
direction: The prohibition on discussing military affairs 
did not prevent members of the Arctic Council from 
successfully concluding the Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, at 
the Ministerial meeting in Nuuk, Greenland in May 2011. 
Search and rescue often involves military organizations, 
and among the lead agencies on the SAR Agreement 
are the U.S. Department of Defense and the Canadian 
Forces. The Canadian Forces hosted the first table top 
exercise with SAR specialists from the Arctic Council 
states on October 5–6, 2011, to discuss joint strategic and 
operational aspects of aeronautical and maritime search 
and rescue in the Arctic (Canada Command 2011). 
While the Agreement is not particularly groundbreaking 
in and of itself, it does provide a platform for strategic 
cooperation among the Arctic states and an avenue for 
confidence building. It is expected that the next major 
deliverable of the Arctic Council will be a mandatory 
Polar Code in 2014 for regulating shipping activity in 
the polar regions. Although the Polar Code under the 
mandate of the International Maritime Organization, 
it has received high-level political support from the 
members of the Arctic Council.
The Arctic Council also recognizes a number of 
indigenous peoples’ organizations, providing opportuni-
ties for the Arctic states to engage with them. The Inuit 
Circumpolar Council (ICC) is one of six such groups 
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that are Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council. 
In 2005 the ICC filed a petition with the Inter American 
Council on Human Rights “seeking relief from viola-
tions of the human rights of Inuit resulting from global 
warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions from 
the United States of America” (ICC 2005). In Alaska, 
Indigenous groups have opposed ship activity based 
on the idea that noise will upset subsistence hunting, 
and some indigenous groups have acted in concert with 
NGOs to oppose drilling in their home territories. A 
related development is the increasing independence 
of the sub-national governments of Greenland and 
Nunavut, who seek greater involvement with regional 
security matters, such as basing of troops and citing 
weapons systems (Loukacheva 2007).
A current issue faced by the Arctic Council is the 
question of whom to accept as formal ‘observers’ and 
what role they should play. The category was established 
to provide a means to include non-Arctic states who 
have contributions to be make in Arctic science and 
other interests in the region. They are non-voting and 
generally silent in policy decisions, although the current 
practice is to allow one of them to speak on behalf of the 
group at Ministerial meetings. During the first ten years 
of the Arctic Council’s existence, the unofficial policy 
was inclusivity; consequently, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain 
were admitted as observers. Since 2007, the European 
Commission, Italy, China, South Korea, and Japan have 
all applied to be observers, but a decision on whether 
to accept them was delayed at the 2009 Ministerial and 
again at the 2011 Ministerial. Guidelines were introduced 
at the May 2011 Ministerial for how to assess applications, 
indicating the possibility that some observers will be 
introduced at the 2013 Ministerial. Given the growing 
international importance of the Arctic and the desire of 
some Arctic states to maintain control over the region’s 
policy, the question of whom to include and how has 
become more acute. 
European Union 
The European Union‘s formal interest in the Arctic goes 
back to its adoption in 2000 of a Northern Dimension 
policy, which came on the heels of the 1995 expansion, 
which brought the membership of Sweden and Finland 
and thus a border with Russia; the policy was revised and 
reissued in 2006  (Council of the European Union 2000, 
European Commission 2006). The Northern Dimension 
aims to enhance collaboration within the region in the 
areas of economic development, environmental protec-
tion, nuclear safety, social wellbeing, and security and 
justice—especially with regard to the transit of people 
and goods. A main focus of the Northern Dimension has 
been the challenges and opportunities presented by the 
proximity to Northwest Russia. Besides the EU, partners 
include Iceland, Norway, and Russia, with Canada and 
the United States participating as observers. 
European Union interest in the Arctic has increased 
as technological advances and climatic changes open 
up opportunities in energy, fisheries and transport. It 
has similarly expressed concern about the dramatic 
climate impacts and the need for effective multilateral 
governance of the region. To that end, the European 
Commission adopted a communication on the European 
Union and the Arctic Region on November 20, 2008 
(European Commission 2008). The communication is 
described as a first step towards a comprehensive EU 
Arctic Policy. The three main policy objectives identified 
in the communication include protecting and preserving 
the Arctic in unison with its population, promoting 
sustainable use of resources, and contributing to 
enhanced Arctic multilateral governance. The Council 
of the European Union affirmed the Communication in 
December 2009 (Council of the European Union 2009).
The European Union has been one of the most 
outspoken advocates for implementing a formal gover-
nance structure to regulate the Arctic. On October 9, 
2008, the European Parliament went so far as to adopt a 
resolution on Arctic governance, specifically calling for 
an Antarctic-style international treaty for the protection 
of the Arctic (European Parliament 2008). The resolu-
tion was a response to the Ilulissat Declaration of May 
2008, which was seen as an attempt by the five Arctic 
Ocean coastal states to exclude others from the region. 
However the Resolution has not found any external 
support, even from the European Commission.
The European Commission hopes to contribute to 
the work of the Arctic Council by becoming a permanent 
observer in that forum, an issue that was addressed at both 
the 2009 and 2011 Ministerial meetings. A final decision 
on their application has been postponed and it has been 
reported that a number of the Arctic Council member 
states, especially Canada and Russia, have been cool to 
EU participation. Members of the Permanent Participants 
have also viewed EU membership negatively because of 
the EU’s opposition to the northern seal fur trade. 
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Ilulissat Declaration 
The five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean—Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States—met in 
May 2008 in Ilulissat, Greenland, to affirm their commit-
ment to the legal framework provided for in “the law of 
the sea” [small caps used in the text of the agreement] 
and to the orderly settlement of any overlapping claims 
(Ilulissat Declaration 2008). They further declared that 
they see no need to develop any new comprehensive legal 
regime for the Arctic. The head of the international law 
department in the Danish Foreign Ministry, Thomas 
Winkler, stated that “the main point is that the five 
coastal states have sent a very clear political signal to 
everybody that we will manage the Arctic responsibly, 
that we have the international rules necessary and we will 
all abide by those rules” (Borger 2008). The Declaration 
has come to represent the states’ commitment to interna-
tional law and cooperation in the region.
Some questions arose as to the need for these five 
states to meet separately from the Arctic Council, 
thereby excluding Iceland, Finland, Sweden and the 
six indigenous permanent participants of the Council, 
as well as the many official observers. These concerns 
came to a head in March 2010, when Canada hosted the 
second meeting of the Arctic Council Foreign Ministers 
in Chelsea, Quebec. The U.S. Secretary of State blind-
sided Canada by announcing just ahead of the meeting 
her concerns with excluding indigenous groups from 
Arctic forums, and then declining to take part in the 
traditional ‘family picture’ held at high level diplomatic 
events. While some observers have subsequently declared 
the end of the “Arctic Five,” the need for the five coastal 
Arctic states to discuss legal maritime matters and joint 
interests in controlling the Arctic Ocean may compel 
additional exclusive gatherings.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
The Arctic is a region of increasing concern for NATO. 
Growing levels of maritime traffic and resource explora-
tion, as well as the potential for dramatically increased 
activity in the near future, has led alliance spokesman 
James Appathurai to label it “a region of enduring strategic 
interest to NATO and allied security” (Appathurai 2009). 
This increased interest comes shortly after the 
issuance of Russian and American policy directives 
emphasizing the importance of the Arctic to their 
national security. The increased focus on the Arctic in 
both Russia’s new marine doctrine and state security 
policy will necessitate increased allied attention, and 
the American’s leading role in NATO will ensure that 
that nation’s interest in the region will be reflected in 
NATO policy.
NATO already has a certain presence in the Arctic 
through its Iceland based Integrated Air Defence System 
and exercises in the region, such as ‘Cold Response’ in 
March, 2009, which involved 7,000 soldiers from France, 
Germany and Spain. Along with Norway, Iceland has 
been particularly active in encouraging a stronger NATO 
presence in the Arctic. In January 2009, the alliance 
held a high level conference on security prospects in 
the High North in Reykjavík. The main topic of discus-
sion was the role of the alliance in the region. NATO 
plans to assume a greater role in a number of matters, 
with ecological relief and search and rescue operations 
specifically identified. By 2010 the Sub-Committee on 
Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation had 
issued a report calling for “proactive engagement” and 
cited increasing desire from within the alliance’s Arctic 
members (particularly Norway, Denmark and Iceland) 
for increased attention to the region (NATO 2010).
Although not officially stated, both Finland and 
Sweden appear to have a growing interest in joining 
NATO. The rearmament of the Russian military, coupled 
with that nation’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy 
and its 2008 intervention in Georgia, appear to be 
making NATO membership increasingly attractive to the 
two traditionally neutral countries in the region. Finland 
and Sweden contributed 250 soldiers to ‘Cold Response’ 
in preparation for a scenario where a fictional country 
moved against offshore oilfields and other mineral 
assets of a regional state. An assessment of the Swedish 
military by the NATO Planning and Review Process led 
to questions about whether the Swedish conservative 
government is trying to sneak the country into NATO. 
In Finland, the country’s Minister for Defence recently 
stated that Finland should consider joining NATO for 
financial reasons. Officially, however, both governments 
deny any plans to join the alliance. 
Not all NATO nations see the alliance as the prin-
cipal, or even a desirable, means of operating in the 
Arctic. Because it possessed the majority of the alliance’s 
Arctic capable military hardware, the United States has 
normally chosen to operate independently in the North, 
while Canadian actions indicated that that country 
would also prefer unilateral action—though in Canada’s 
case the issue would be concern about sovereignty.
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The question of energy security is also an important 
one for the alliance, a point agreed to in 2008 during the 
NATO summit at Bucharest. With increasing Arctic oil and 
gas production north of Norway and Russia, and continued 
exploration above Canada and the United States, the 
Arctic is an obvious location to exercise that mandate.
Yet, NATO does not foresee its Arctic role as being 
primarily military. While there will have to be a military 
component to its presence it does not predict any 
conventional conflict. The Secretary General stated 
simply: “I would be the last one to expect military 
conflict—but there will be a military presence.” Instead, 
NATO hopes to promote cooperation between the 
alliance and Russia through the NATO-Russia Council, 
and within the alliance itself. With three of its members 
pressing competing claims to offshore jurisdiction, a role 
for NATO in Arctic cooperation could make sense. Using 
NATO as a forum for discussion, while providing the 
military assets necessary to assist in maritime security, is 
part of the comprehensive approach the alliance hopes 
to take in concert with other multinational stakeholders, 
such as the Arctic Council and the European Union.
North American Aerospace Defense  
Command (NORAD)
NORAD has a long history in the North American Arctic. 
Formed to protect the continent from Soviet bomber 
attack in 1958, the bi-national command is tasked with 
ensuring aerospace surveillance over North America. 
NORAD’s Arctic mission began in the 1950s as Canada 
and the United States established Northern radar posts to 
detect and, if necessary, intercept Soviet bomber incur-
sions. Fifty years later, many of the Russian Cold War-era 
bombers the system was designed to track are once again 
flying strategic patrols around the Arctic Circle.
Today NORAD is tasked with tracking not only 
military aircraft but the hundreds of annual commercial 
transpolar flights moving in and out of North American 
airspace. After the terrorist attacks on the United States 
on September 11, 2001, concern over airplane hijacking 
and infiltration has increased and the surveillance of 
Arctic airspace has taken on an even greater urgency. 
Along these lines, cooperation with Russia has increase 
in recent years. In 2010 joint Russia-NORAD exercises 
began to test response capabilities in the event of a 
terrorist hijacking of one of the 1,000 daily flights in the 
region. Reports indicate that NORAD-Russian communi-
cation is improving as a result.
In May 2006 Canada and the United States renewed 
the NORAD agreement and added a maritime surveil-
lance clause (Canada-United States 2006). With the 
increasing accessibility of the Arctic waters and the 
expanding traffic that has resulted, NORAD must 
now also monitor the Northern Waters for potential 
maritime intruders. As early as August 2008 NORAD 
Commander Gene Renuart emphasized the potential 
security threats in the Arctic posed by the thinning 
ice and the increased potential for resource extraction 
(Renuart 2010).
NORAD does not have the mandate to intercept mari-
time threats; that responsibility falls to either Canada 
Command or U.S. Northern Command, depending on 
jurisdiction. Nor does NORAD anticipate a renewed 
military threat in the region. However the anticipated 
increase in both maritime and aerospace traffic in the 
Arctic has definitely reinforced the need for surveillance 
and refocused NORAD’s role in the region.
Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) 
The new Nordic Defence Cooperation, or NORDEFCO, 
builds on existing collective security arrangements 
in the Nordic area, but with a view to broadening 
and deepening existing cooperation with a defense 
pact. It began as an initiative among the Norwegian, 
Swedish and Finnish Chiefs of Defence, with a report 
submitted in June 2008 outlining potential areas for 
cooperation and harmonization. Iceland and Denmark 
joined the arrangement in November 2008, when the 
Defence Ministers of the five Nordic countries signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding 
the enhanced Nordic cooperation in Nordic Supportive 
Defense Structures (NORDSUP 2008). That initiative 
encompassed cooperation in defense related areas such 
as the procurement of defense materiel, education of 
armed forces, and defense research, and aimed to make 
better use of existing defense resources. 
A report that the group had originally commissioned 
in June 2008 on proposals to enhance foreign and 
security cooperation between the Nordic countries was 
released in February 2009 (Stoltenberg 2009). Named 
the Stoltenberg Report after its chief author, former 
Norwegian foreign and defense minister Thorvald 
Stoltenberg, it outlined the main issues facing the 
group. These included the resurgence of Russia and its 
economic and military focus in the Arctic, as well as the 
need to join efforts in order to sustain the quality of 
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their armed forces amidst the increasing financial strain 
of maintaining modern, well equipped forces. 
The report included a number of specific proposals. 
It called for the establishment of a joint maritime rapid 
action group based on the countries’ coast guards and 
rescue services, pan-Nordic monitoring of Icelandic 
airspace, joint Nordic icebreaker capacities, and the 
development of a joint amphibious unit adjusted to 
Arctic conditions. It also proposed the development of a 
joint two-pillar surveillance system covering the Barents 
and Baltic Seas, the development of a joint Nordic 
satellite monitoring system, a joint catastrophe unit, 
enhanced coordination of defense training and educa-
tion, and the establishment of joint military medical and 
transport capacities.
Although the report was not free of controversy, it 
catalyzed the signing of an even more comprehensive 
Nordic defense cooperation MoU, signed by the Nordic 
defense ministers on November 4, 2009, establishing 
the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO 2009). 
Consequently NORDSUP, NORDAC and NORDCAPS—
the original security cooperation initiatives—were termi-
nated and reorganized under the new comprehensive 
structure—NORDEFCO. Foreign Ministers from the five 
countries met in Copenhagen in March 2010 to discuss 
further implementation of the Stoltenberg proposals.
The main aim and purpose of the Nordic Defence 
Cooperation is “to strengthen the participating nations’ 
national defense, explore common synergies and facili-
tate efficient common solutions” (Nordefco.org 2012). 
Although areas of cooperation are quite broadly defined, 
there is little doubt that the timing and impetus around 
the cooperation pact revolve around new concerns, as 
well as regional opportunities, in the Arctic. Denmark, 
which holds the presidency of NORDEFCO in 2012, has 
identified Arctic cooperation as one its priority areas.
United Nations 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) was adopted in 1982 and entered into force 
in 1994. The Convention establishes a 200-mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) within which coastal states have 
sovereign rights to the exploration and exploitation 
of living and non-living natural resources. It further 
stipulates, in Article 76, that states can further claim 
sovereign rights to any continental shelf that extends 
from their territorial waters, up to a maximum of 350 
miles from their coastline (United Nations 1982). Both 
of these new maritime zones have important implica-
tions for international affairs in the Arctic. Much of the 
“scramble for the Arctic” revolves around Article 76. 
The five coastal states, understandably, have been eager 
to maximize their claims in order to capitalize on any 
future exploitation of the significant oil and gas reserves 
of the Arctic basin. 
Parties to UNCLOS have ten years after ratifying 
the convention to submit their claim. Mapping the 
continental shelf in and around the Arctic has proven 
complicated and expensive and has elicited coopera-
tion between some of the states, in particular Canada 
and the United States in the Beaufort Sea, and Canada 
and Denmark in the Lincoln Sea. Of the five coastal 
states, only Norway has submitted its final claim, which 
was reviewed and recommended for acceptance under 
the treaty (UNCLOS Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf 2009). In 2001, Russia became the 
first country to submit its claim, but the Commission 
recommended it revise the submission to include more 
scientific clarity, which as of writing it has not been 
done. Canada and Denmark’s deadlines are 2013 and 
2014, respectively. The United States has yet to accede 
to UNCLOS, despite support from both the Bush 
and Obama administrations and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, a fact that may complicate their 
efforts to dispute or claim their share of the continental 
shelf under the accepted framework of international law. 
There remains a very good chance that competing 
claims will emerge in the Arctic, particularly between 
Canada, Denmark, and Russia. This depends on whether 
or not the undersea Lomonosov Ridge is a continuation 
of Russian, Danish, or Canadian territory. Elsewhere, 
competing claims may emerge between Norway and 
Russia, and Canada and the United States. 
A debate has emerged in Arctic circles over whether 
UNCLOS alone provides an adequate legal framework 
for governance of the region, or whether some additional 
agreement is needed; the circumpolar states tend to 
lean towards the former, as enunciated in the Ilulissat 
Declaration. UNCLOS Article 197 actually encourages 
states to develop regional agreements where appropriate. 
INDUSTRY 
Oil and gas 
One of the most important developments in the 
circumpolar Arctic over the past decade has been the 
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development of the region’s hydrocarbon resources. The 
U.S. Geological Survey estimates the undiscovered poten-
tial of the Arctic to be 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels 
of natural gas liquids, of which approximately 84% is 
expected to occur in offshore areas (Bird, et al. 2008).
Over the past few years, all of the multinational oil 
and gas companies have moved back into Arctic explora-
tion. Declining reserves in some of the world’s oldest oil 
producing regions, increasing accessibility in the North, 
and a dearth of new finds elsewhere has led many to 
reassess the energy potential of the region. Many of the 
major companies involved are state owned—particularly 
those in Russia—making national and corporate policy 
nearly indistinguishable. Yet, even the private corpora-
tions have strong connections to government and 
their success in developing national resources is widely 
considered to be of great national interest. 
NORTH AMERICA 
In the summer of 2007 Imperial Oil and Exxon shocked 
observers with a nearly $600 million bid that won them 
a 205,321 hectare exploration lease on the Canadian 
side of the Beaufort Sea. In February 2008, Shell and 
ConocoPhillips bid nearly $2.7 billion in a blockbuster 
competition for drilling rights in the Chukchi Sea—a 
record for any Alaskan oil or gas lease. The last Chukchi 
sale in 1991, for instance, generated $7.1 million. British 
Petroleum, which as recently as 2002 announced that 
it had no interest in further Arctic exploration, spent 
nearly $1.2 billion in a June 2008 auction for oil and gas 
exploration leases covering roughly 611,000 hectares of 
the Beaufort seabed north of Tuktoyaktuk. In the same 
auction, two other leases were won by a trio of companies 
led by MGM Energy and including ConocoPhillips 
Canada Resources and Phillips Petroleum Canada. 
These companies spent $4.3 million for rights to 237,820 
hectares of offshore exploration rights.
After the 2011 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, exploration 
was put on hold in both Canada and the United States, as 
government panels were commissioned to examined the 
dangers of offshore drilling in an Arctic environment. 
In the Unites States the National Commission on the 
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill issued its final report 
in January 2011 and recommended increased safety 
precautions and international standards, but stopped 
short of recommending a moratorium on Arctic drilling 
(National Oil Spill Commission 2011). In Canada the 
National Energy Board released its final report in 
December 2011, and it too has cleared the way for future 
operations, in particular by allowing companies to 
bypass an onerous obligation to be able to drill a same-
season relief well if they can demonstrate an ability to 
meet the same objectives through other means (National 
Energy Board 2011).
Shell has the most advanced plans for operations 
in North America and plans to begin exploratory 
drilling in the Chukchi Sea in the summer of 2012. 
The remaining oil majors are also spending billions 
on Arctic exploration. Imperial Oil, ENI, Chevron and 
Statoil—among others—are conducting preliminary 
seismic exploration in preparation for exploratory 
drilling. ConocoPhillips has set 2013–2014 as a possible 
start date for its drilling, while Repsol has committed to 
spend $768 million on its Arctic exploration program, 
to start in 2012 (Kollmeyer 2011). By Necessity, these 
plans are long-term investments. Shell, for instance, does 
not expect to begin commercial production of Beaufort 
Sea oil until 2019 and of gas until 2029 (Burden, et al. 
2009). In the Chukchi, which is farther from established 
infrastructure, the expected production start date for oil 
is 2022 and for gas it is 2036.
Farther east, off the western coast of Greenland, 
Cairn Energy is currently involved in a multiyear drilling 
program looking for oil in the Davis Strait and Baffin 
Bay. Results have been mixed, with early success marred 
by a series of dry wells in the 2011 drilling season. 
Further activity is planned for the summer of 2012.
In recent years new shale gas techniques have opened 
up enormous new gas reserves in the continental United 
States, depressing the price of natural gas and altering 
the economics of Arctic gas production. With gas 
prices stagnating, exploration is focused more on oil 
than gas, which is one reason for the greater activity in 
the oil-rich Chukchi over the gas-rich Beaufort. Some 
of the more expensive gas-focused projects are likely 
to be cancelled or shelved for the foreseeable future. 
This is likely to include the $17-billion Mackenzie Gas 
Project, a joint venture among the Canadian branches 
of ConocoPhillips, Exxon, Imperial Oil, and a Canadian 
aboriginal group. The first major defection from the 
project came in July 2011 as Shell announced that it was 
seeking to sell its 11% stake in the project to focus on 
newly acquired shale reserves. 
In Russia there have been similar reassessments, 
represented by the February 2010 decision to postpone 
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the development of the Shtokman natural gas field in 
the Barents Sea. Previously, plans had envisaged the field 
becoming operational in 2013–2014, however with half of 
the field’s gas having been earmarked to supply the now 
saturated U.S. market, the project has lost some of its 
impetus (Eie 2010).
EURASIA 
Russia has a long history of Arctic oil and gas production 
and hydrocarbon development in the Eurasian Arctic 
is more advanced than in North America. At present a 
number of major production and export facilities are 
now online with huge new projects in the construction 
and planning stages. 
North of Hammerfest, in the Barents Sea, Statoil is 
already operating the large Snøhvit liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) plant and planning more exploration and test 
wells in the area. The project is producing 5.6 billion m³ 
of LNG and involved a total investment of over $5 billion 
for field development, pipeline and land plant with an 
additional $500 million spent on tankers (hydrocarbons-
technology.com 2012).
In Russia, development has been proceeding rapidly 
in the Timan-Pechora basin, the Barents Sea, and in the 
Far East. Working with international partners, Russian 
state-owned company Gazprom is investing heavily in 
the development of the gas and oil resources on and 
around the Yamal Peninsula and Sakhalin Island. 
Gazprom’s Shtokman gas and Prirazlomnoye oil fields in 
the Barents Sea are some of the world’s most northerly 
areas under development, and the company expects their 
hydrocarbon reserves on Russia’s Arctic shelf to increase 
by 41.1 billion barrels oil equivalent by 2020 (Gazprom 
2009, 2012). 
The independent Russian oil giant Lukoil is also 
heavily committed to development in the Timan-Pechora 
Basin and the Barents Sea. Its $620 million Varandey 
transshipment terminal in the Barents is designed to 
ship 12 million tons of oil via ice-breaking tankers to 
Murmansk each year for transshipment to international 
customers. It is thus little wonder that Moscow and 
both state-owned and private companies have declared 
the region to be of vital long-term importance for the 
development of the Russian oil and gas industry.
The most significant recent development has been the 
announcement of a joint venture between state-owned 
Rosneft and ExxonMobil, with Exxon committed to 
spend over $2 billion working in the Kara Sea. Exxon, 
which will be a minority partner in the venture, will 
bring badly needed foreign capital and expertise to 
the region. Its presence represents a shift in Russian 
state policy towards increased cooperation with foreign 
multinationals, something which only a few years ago 
seemed unlikely.
All public statements and publications indicate that 
these companies will continue aggressive exploration 
and development in the region, representing the 
majority of economic activity in the circumpolar Arctic 
for years to come. This development will also carry with it 
the security risks inherent to the protection and develop-
ment of valuable natural resources.
Shipping
Global warming and the consequent melting of Arctic 
sea ice will make it increasingly feasible for vessels to use 
Arctic waters as a shipping route. While scientists cannot 
be sure when the Arctic will be largely ice-free during 
the summer months, it seems to be happening faster 
than expected (section II). Most recent assessments put 
the range between 2020 and 2050. The summer of 2007 
had the lowest level of sea ice ever recorded, with the 
Northwest Passage navigable for the first time in recorded 
history. However, dark and cold winter months in the 
Arctic means that it will not be navigable year round. 
Potential trans-Arctic shipping routes offer significant 
economic and strategic advantages, shortening the 
distance needed to transport goods between Asia, North 
America, and Europe by up to 4000 nautical miles, 
and reducing shipping time by up to two weeks. It also 
offers a cost-effective means by which to transport Arctic 
resources, including oil, gas, and minerals, to southern 
markets. Several ship-building and oil companies 
are investing in the development of new types of ice-
strengthened tankers and vessels to capitalize on such 
opportunities. 
Despite the rare international passage, such as the MV 
Beluga Fraternity’s trip through the Northern Sea Route 
in 2009, the prospects for trans–Arctic shipping remain 
poor for the foreseeable future because of continuing 
difficult environmental conditions and accordingly high 
insurance rates. However, more local resource shipping 
is already being planned for the near term, including 
increased activity in the Russian Arctic, linked to 
petroleum exploration and development in the Barents 
and Kara Seas, and in the North American Beaufort and 
Chukchi Seas. Significant shipping activity is planned 
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to accompany the development of the Mary River iron 
ore mine on Baffin Island. Once in operation, which 
is anticipated in 2015, Mary River is expected to use a 
dedicated fleet of cape-sized ore carriers and, potentially, 
some very large bulk carriers to ship 18 million tonnes of 
ore per year for 21 years, from a port near Igloolik into 
the Foxe Basin. In Nunavut, new bulk exports are also 
expected to include magnetite from Roche Bay, and lead, 
zinc, and copper concentrate from Izok Lake, shipped 
out from Gray’s Bay or Bathurst Inlet.
An increase in Arctic shipping poses serious risks to 
the environment, as the ecosystem there is particularly 
vulnerable to pollution and disturbance. Current tech-
nologies used to clean up oil spills on ice are inadequate, 
yet accidents are more likely to occur in the Arctic given 
the challenging weather conditions and ice infestation. 
The Arctic’s harsh conditions also pose challenges to 
increasing cruise ship and adventure tourism in the 
area, with the sinking of the MV Explorer in November 
2007 and the rescue of the Ushuaia in December 2008 
in Antarctica offering glimpses of what to expect in the 
Arctic. Current cruise ship levels have reached up to 250 
per year in the area around Greenland and Nunavut, and 
an accident of some sort is probably only a matter of time.
The region is also largely devoid of shipping infra-
structure and navigational aids. At present only, roughly 
10% of the total Arctic maritime area is surveyed to 
modern standards (The Canadian Press 2010). The 
result has been relatively frequent groundings. The 2010 
groundings of the Nanny, a tanker carrying nine million 
liters of fuel in the Simpson Strait, and the Clipper 
Adventure, a cruise ship in Coronation Gulf, are only the 
most recent examples.
The current regime governing shipping in the Arctic, 
the IMO’s Guidelines for Ships Operating in Ice-Covered 
Waters, is voluntary, although work is underway on a 
mandatory Polar Code, which expected to enter force 
in 2014, barring further delays (IMO 2002, 2012). The 
primary concerns of the code are vessel construction 
standards, polar safety equipment, and the requirement 
for a qualified ice navigator. However, at present develop-
ment and implementation of such a code is being held up 
by differences of opinion within the IMO about the desir-
ability of including regulations on operational source.
Many of the major Arctic powers are concerned with 
the development of Arctic shipping, and occasionally 
their ideas clash. While the Russian government is 
actively seeking to expand the use of its Northern Sea 
Route, its insistence that the key straits in the region are 
Russian internal waters clashes with the American posi-
tion laid out in that country’s recent policy document. 
Likewise the Canadian claim of internal water in the 
Northwest Passage has been the source of past and likely 
future political disputes with the United States.
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